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Abstract 
 
This work focuses on the application of ADS-B surveillance data as inputs 
for conflict detection algorithms, in order to support future self-separation as well 
as collision avoidance systems. In particular, an approach is here proposed for 
conflict detection between ownship and surrounding ADS-B OUT equipped 
aircraft, which uses traffic position and velocity data provided by the on-board 
ADS-B IN device. The intended system applicability is for both manned 
commercial aircraft, as an aid to pilots, and Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS), 
where high automation levels are required, as part of an autonomous Sense-And-
Avoid system. 
In the first part of the work, a detailed analysis on state of the art of the SAA 
systems is shown investigating the architectures based on cooperative and non-
cooperative sensors. 
In the expected evolution of surveillance systems for aircraft applications in 
the next years, the Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B) 
implementation on-board vehicles plays a fundamental role hence, in the second 
part, a detailed analysis about ADS-B system is reported. The advantages and the 
drawbacks related to the adoption of this sensor for a SAA architecture are also 
investigated. 
In the third part the architecture of the proposed system is presented 
including a description of the software modules, focusing on the specific 
applications devoted to surveillance data processing and conflicts identification 
and prioritization.  
Finally test scenarios, and the related results, are presented and discussed. In 
particular off-line and real-time tests, with an hardware in the loop architecture, 
have been carried out. 
The activities hereafter reported have been carried out in the framework of a 
collaboration between the Italian Aerospace Research Centre (CIRA), where the 
author is employed in the field of air transport sustainability, and the University of 
Naples “Federico II”. 
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Chapter 1  
 
Survey on Sense And Avoid Systems 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) have grown exponentially in the last 
decade and a lot of applications proved UAV reason for existence. Most of those 
applications are military but more and more civil and commercial opportunities 
are opening for UAVs. In fact, the size of UAVs is extremely variable and it 
makes possible to perform some tasks impracticable or dangerous for manned 
aircraft, such as detecting, monitoring and measuring the evolution of natural 
disasters, like forest fires or landslips [1]. 
Especially in U.S., numerous efforts have been made, by governments and 
industries, in order to integrate UAVs in the NAS. Among the years, an extensive 
research has been carried out especially in the framework of navigation and 
control techniques regarding UAVs [2] but some lacks still remain in terms of 
safety. In fact the major obstacle to integrate UAVs in the NAS is the lack of a 
sense-and-avoid capability similar to the one provided by on-board pilots, and the 
consequent possibility of mid-air collisions. Therefore, although the efficiency of 
those systems have been proved under different and various conditions, their 
safety, reliability and compliance with aviation regulations still has to be proved. 
Certainly, the fundamental difference between a UAV and a manned aircraft 
is the physical absence of the pilot on-boards who also interacts with the ground-
based air traffic control (ATC) system. Essentially an UAV is remotely piloted 
although it is capable of numerous automate operations. It implicates that the pilot 
has not direct situational awareness and the one of the most significant challenges, 
is the replacement of the “see-and-avoid” capability, with the “sense-and-avoid” 
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one [3]. In the following a regulatory and technology survey of sense-and-avoid 
systems will be reported.  
1.2 Regulatory state of the art of SAA systems 
Since the pilot remotely controls the UAV it is necessary to replace the 
“see-and-avoid” capacity with the “sense-and-avoid” capacity.  
The U.S. regulatory survey of sense-and-avoid, carried out by Douglas M. 
Marshall et al. [4], gives an indication about the challenges related to the 
integration of UAVs into the NAS. 
The cornerstone of the current VFR, i.e. the concept of “see and be seen” 
had its first appearance in a Federal regulation, in the Air Commerce Act of 1926. 
Only in 1955 the CAB (the predecessor of FAA) inserted the sentence “see and be 
seen” in a document [5] which stated “the philosophy behind the Visual Flight 
Rules is that aircraft being flown in accordance with these rules are operated in 
“see and be seen” weather conditions permitting the pilots to observe and avoid 
other traffic”. Starting from this, in 1968, the FAA published an amendment 
confirming the pilot’s responsibility and now the amendment 91 CFR states 
“When weather conditions permit, regardless of whether an operation is 
conducted under instrument flight rules or visual flight rules, vigilance shall be 
maintained by each person operating an aircraft so as to see and avoid other 
aircraft.” [6] and in addition pilots are responsible to not “operate an aircraft so 
close to another aircraft as to create a collision hazard” [7]. 
Although the term “operate”, as reported in FAA Section 1.1 (“ [operate] 
means use, cause to be used, or authorize to use aircraft, for the purpose…of air 
navigation including the piloting of aircraft, with or without the right of legal 
control” [8]) may include UAV operations, there isn’t a specific part set aside for 
unmanned aircraft (but it exists the counterpart for the operation of moored 
balloons, kites, unmanned rockets, and unmanned free balloons [9]). Only in 1981 
the Advisory Circular 91.57 referred directly to unmanned aircraft: it introduced 
the standards for model aircraft.  
Over the years many efforts have been done in order to develop SAA 
requirements and in 2004 the RTCA Special Committee 203 (SC-203) was 
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formed. It had the task of produce the MASPS for several systems including the 
MASPS for Sense And Avoid. The quantitative performance standards for a SAA 
system (MASPS), would have been published on December 2013 [10] (but the 
document will not be issued).  
In 2005 and 2007 the FAA emitted two policy statements that pronounced 
pilot’s duty to see-and-avoid other aircraft and, concerning the UAV, the 
responsibility of the pilot to conducts visual line-of-sight operations [11].  
Between December 2008 and March 2009, the FAA organized several 
workshops in order to define the capabilities that a SAA system should have to be 
compliant with the current rules governing the “see-and-avoid”. The workshop 
published a document in October 2009 [12], where the sense-and-avoid concept 
was defined as “the capability of [an unmanned aircraft] to remain well clear from 
and avoid collisions with other airborne traffic”. Moreover the workshop defines 
that a SAA system would be characterized by two components: 
• A Self-Separation component that assures a safe separation based on 
a variable time-based threshold. In this way the aircraft remain 
“well-clear” of each other; 
• A Collision  Avoidance component that operates when the safe 
separation is lost and an extreme manoeuver is needed to prevent a 
collision, i.e. penetrating the collision volume. In fact, for the 
collision avoidance maneuver, a distance based threshold is 
considered. 
The SC-203 sunset on June 2013 and, contextually, the SC-228 was created. 
The committee has the task of produce the MOPS for Unmanned Aircraft Systems 
planned for July 2016 [13]. The committee delivered two White Papers in 
December 2013: Detect and Avoid (DAA) White Paper and Command and 
Control (C2) White Paper [14]. 
Currently the FAA Regulation states that an UAV “must provide equivalent 
levels of safety, comparable to see-and-avoid requirements for manned aircraft” 
[15] and the UAV that wants to operate in U.S. NAS must obtain Certificates of 
Authorization. Note that an equivalent level of safety to the see capabilities of 
manned aircraft implies that the SAA system must be able to detect “other aircraft 
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within a range of ±15° elevation and ±110° azimuth and respond in sufficient time 
so that a collision is avoided by a minimum of 500 ft. The 500 ft margin of safety 
derives from what is commonly defined as a near midair collision.” [16]. 
In the European framework, relevant effort is devoted to support the 
definition of suitable standards allowing the integration of UAS into the civil 
airspace. EDA (the European Defense Agency) funded the ongoing project 
MIDCAS (Mid-air Collision Avoidance System), started in 2009 and expected to 
be completed by 2015, whose budget has been set to approximately 50 M€. The 
specific aim of MIDCAS is to identify adequate technology, contribute to 
standardization and demonstrate a SAA system for UAS able to fulfill the 
requirements for traffic separation and mid-air collision avoidance in non-
segregated airspace. The MIDCAS SAA system is currently in the final test 
campaign, using a UAV in real world environment, and the project findings are 
shared with European regulatory bodies to provide the technical background for 
them to establish SAA standards. Therefore, the outcomes of the MIDCAS project 
will be used as baseline input for the process of standardization of UAV 
integration into non-segregated airspace 
 
1.3 Challenges on Certification of SAA systems 
In order to defines a set of SAA standards, for the certification and 
operational approval of UAVs, the Workshop of 2009 identified a set of 
requirements categorized by sub-function. They are reported in Table 1.1 that is 
an extract of the document emitted by the FAA “Sense, and Avoid Technology for 
Unmanned Aircraft Systems “ [17]: 
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Table 1.1 - Requirements for SSA systems [17] 
 
Nevertheless, a wide range of possible solutions are available and a trade-
off between the sub-functions is needed in order to take into account, for example, 
the traffic characteristics of the interested airspace class, the aircraft performance 
and the size, weight, cost and performance of the sensors. Moreover, also the 
architecture of the SAA system has to be taken into account. An issue is the pilot 
control latency and the communication link, and how the UAV pilot remotely 
controls the UAV. The pilot, on the ground, would receive surveillance data from 
the UAV, evaluate the situation and communicate the avoidance manoeuver on-
board after the decision on when and how avoid the threat has been taken. But 
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another solution would be to use an automatic collision avoidance algorithm on-
board the UAV with no communication with the pilot [18]. 
Another trade-off is related to the interaction between the sensors and the 
avoidance manoeuvres. In fact the accuracies and performance of the sensing 
system are strictly related to the used sensors and so the collision avoidance 
manoeuvre could respect the minimum required distance or consider an extra-size 
in order to compensate the possible measurement errors [18]. 
For those reasons is not possible to adopt a common SAA algorithm for all 
UAVs, unlike the manned collision avoidance system TCAS II that uses a single 
threat algorithm [19]. 
In the following, a review on possible sensors solution and SAA 
architecture will be given. 
 
1.4 SAA Available Technologies Survey 
“Currently is no recognized technology solution that could make these 
aircraft capable of meeting regulatory requirements for see-and-avoid and 
command and control” is a statement of Nick Sabatini (associate FAA 
administrator for aviation safety) articulated before the House Committee on 
Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Aviation on Unmanned 
Aircraft Activities in 2006 [20]. The situation is not very changed ever since, due 
to the complexity of sense-and-avoid technologies and an initial FAA certification 
of an airborne SAA will not take place until the next year [21]. For this reason, a 
great effort has been made, during the lasts years, by industry and agencies in 
order to identify a technological solution that could satisfy an equivalent level of 
safety of manned aircraft. 
The technologies that have been used, during the years, can be divided in 
two macro-areas [22]: 
• Cooperative Technologies that typically require a transponder on 
board the aircraft; they require other aircraft to be equipped with the 
same devices when sharing the same airspace. 
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• Non Cooperative Technologies that identify all the aircraft not 
equipped with a transponder or, for example, gliders, hot air 
balloons and so on; they do not require other aircraft to be equipped 
with the same devices when sharing the same airspace. 
Note that, in a multi-sensor approach, a data fusion system is required to 
integrate the best features of the dissimilar sensors while ensuring high reliability 
and limiting the computational burden so as to enable real time software 
implementation. 
1.4.1 Cooperative Technologies 
TCAS 
Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) [19] is the principal 
collision avoidance systems and it uses transponder in order to transmit 
information. Therefore it generates alerts for the pilot for potential collision 
threats related to transponder-equipped aircraft. In addition to traffic advisories 
(TA) the TCAS II can provide resolution advisories (RA) supporting the pilot in 
the conflict resolution [23]-[24]. Note that the suggested collision avoidance 
maneuver is generated in a cooperative manner with the other aircraft. TCAS is 
mandated on all aircraft with 10 seats or more. Nevertheless this systems was 
never intended to replace see-and-avoid and, moreover, a safe horizontal 
maneuver is not guaranteed due to the low accuracy of bearing measurements. 
 
ADS-B 
Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Broadcast (ADS-B) is a relatively new 
technology and it was developed in order to support aircraft operation and 
overcome the ground based radar surveillance [25]-[26]. Actually, it allows both 
ground station and pilots to detect other ADS-B equipped aircraft with more much 
precision than ever. 
ADS–B consists of two different services: ADS-B OUT and ADS-B IN. In a 
typical application, aircraft equipped with ADS-B OUT technology compute their 
own precise position through satellite-based GPS. This information, along with 
other such as altitude, velocity, identification (and others which will be described 
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in the following chapter) are transmitted in broadcast via a discrete frequency via 
a data-link. Those information can be received by other aircraft equipped with 
ADS-B IN technology or ground station improving the awareness of pilots about 
the surrounding traffic conditions and reducing the risk of misleading controllers 
orders due to stress condition. The main expected outcome of ADS-B technology 
is the improvement of the Separation Assurance function and in the future the 
ADS-B will enable pilots to perform self-Separation Assurance manoeuvres [27]-
[28]. The introduction of ADS- B will provide specific benefits to support the 
integration of UAV into civil airspace. Moreover, General Aviation aircraft will 
be provided with a system that will ensure a remarkable increase in the overall 
situational awareness and a reduction in the number of collision threats. 
 
1.4.2 Cooperative technologies on UAV 
Cooperative technologies are widely used on manned aircraft due to their 
proved reliability. Moreover those systems have been already certified and 
approved for use. Nevertheless there are some disadvantage that must be taken 
into account when the cooperative sensors are intended to use on UAVs. First of 
all, cooperative technologies, effectively, work only when all the aircraft in the 
shared airspace possess and utilize them. They provide no SAA capability against 
ground obstacles, i.e. terrain and mountains, and they were developed assuming 
that a pilot would be in the loop evaluating warnings and taking the appropriate 
manoeuvres. Moreover, some of those systems, such as TCAS, might be cost 
prohibitive for some users. For these reasons, a recertification might be needed for 
use in UAVs, in order to maintain the equivalent level of safety of manned aircraft 
[17]. 
 
1.4.3 Non-Cooperative Technologies 
Active Microwave Sensors 
Active microwave sensors represent a suitable option to provide the 
required situational  awareness in the case of medium/large UAV platforms which 
have to attain a reliable full autonomy from ground. In fact, airborne radars 
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provide direct and typically accurate range estimates (also range rate if Doppler 
processing is used). Moreover, they can guarantee large detection range, low 
levels of missed or false detections (ground echoes have to be properly filtered), 
and can be not much affected by weather conditions, so that the all-time all-
weather operation can be guaranteed.  
It is worth noting that, in the choice of wavelength, maximizing detection 
range, minimizing sensor dimensions to enable installation on-board a lightweight 
aircraft, and improving as much as possible angular resolution are contradicting 
requirements. In fact, radars operating at low frequencies are relatively unaffected 
by atmosphere, but are large in size and unable to provide required spatial 
resolution, due to main lobe width, which is directly proportional to operating 
wavelength 
l
KdB
λ
σ =3 . The parameter K is a coefficient whose value depends 
on the considered aperture and feeding, and l is the antenna length in the 
considered direction. In conventional architectures the main lobe width coincides 
with the achievable angular resolution. A higher frequency radar, instead, is 
smaller in size and provides better resolution for given aperture size, but is more 
susceptible to atmospheric and weather effects, and in particular to rain, as it 
results if we consider atmospheric attenuation produced by fog and rain. 
Frequencies ranging from C-band (about 6 GHz) to Ka and W band (35 and 
94 GHz, respectively) have been used and/or proposed in sense and avoid 
applications. 
Besides angular resolution, other important performance parameters are the 
detection range, the range and Doppler resolution, the achievable field of regard 
and scan rate.  
The detection range for a given target can be calculated in probabilistic 
terms on the basis of achievable signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) and the number of 
impulses integrated to perform target detection [29]. 
Given a field of regard, the achievable scan rate depends on the radar pulse 
repetition frequency (PRF, which in its turn influences average power 
consumption and maximum unambiguous range), number of integrated pulses for 
each resolution cell, and main lobe width. 
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Compared with mechanically scanned systems, electronically scanned 
arrays have the  significant advantage of beam agility, i.e., the beam can pointed 
adaptively without the  constraints of mechanical inertia. Thus, track update rate 
for a given target can be increased without significant effects on the revisit rate in 
the rest of the sensor field of regard.  
However, electronic scanning allows beam pointing within angular limits 
which are smaller than typical sense and avoid requirements. In general, 
standalone radar architectures are typically characterized by coarse angular 
resolutions (order 1°) and low update rates (order 1 Hz), since finer resolution 
essentially implies larger antenna dimensions. In general radars are demanding in 
terms of cost, size, weight and required electric power, so that they do not 
represent an affordable sensing solution for small unmanned platforms, 
considering current technological levels. However, increasing efforts are being 
made towards miniaturization and adaptation to small UAV. 
 
Laser (LIDAR) 
Laser systems work similarly to conventional radar: laser scans are taken at 
regular interval and processed by an echo-analysis software. The obstacles and 
intruders can be used as input to automated collision avoidance systems [30]. Due 
to their high configurability, laser systems can be used in several atmospheric 
conditions reducing the false alarms. Moreover, they are capable to detect small 
obstacles up to 5 mm of diameter and large obstacles such as  buildings and 
bridge.  
 
Electro Optical Systems 
Electro-optical sensors are largely used in the framework of collision 
avoidance systems for small UAV thanks to the low cost, power consumption and 
weight. In particular they are often used as standalone systems or in integrated 
architectures comprising radar or other systems, to produce an estimate of vehicle 
states through a multi sensor fusion.  
In terms of wavelength, visible band sensors are usually exploited to detect 
the sunlight scattering from other aircraft, while during nighttime when no Sun 
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scattering is available, the best solution is to use a Thermal Infra Red sensor that 
can detect the energy emitted by the same object.  
Important parameters relevant to EO detection and tracking performance are 
related to the available field of view and angular resolution.  
In general, standalone EO systems require heavy computational resources in 
order to fulfill real-time full image detection of obstacles, and their output can 
suffer from a high false alarm rate since background removal processing is less 
accurate as the image size increases. Moreover, EO detection range is very much 
affected by weather and illumination conditions and it can be poor. 
 
Acoustic Sensors 
Acoustic sensors can be used to detect and track aircraft basing on the signal 
emitted from a propeller-driven aircraft which comprises a strong narrowband 
tone imposed onto a broadband random component. 
 
1.4.4 Cooperative and Non-cooperative technologies summary 
The advantages and drawbacks for existing technologies are indicated in 
Table 1.2, which is an extract of the accurate analysis conducted by Yu X. et al. in 
[31]. Moreover, the effective detection ranges of the introduced sensors are 
illustrated in Figure 1.1 (which is extracted from Ref. [31]) 
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Table 1.2 - The characteristics of sensor technologies [31] 
 
 
Figure 1.1 - Detection range of typical sensors [31] 
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Moreover in [32] are reported the mainly characteristics of most used 
sensors in SAA. They can be summarized as follows: 
• Optical Sensors (Pixel/Visual): 
- Low cost, size and weight; 
- Suffer atmospheric disturbances; 
- A visual radar is highly comparable to a human’s ability of 
observe (equal level of safety); 
- To achieve the required FOV, sensors have to be arrayed in 
various position on the aircraft, taking up valuable external 
area. 
• Infrared Sensors: 
- Higher cost than EO; 
- Low size and weight; 
- Able to conduct nighttime operations; 
- Operate under harsh weather conditions; 
- To achieve the required FOV, sensors have to be arrayed in 
various position on the aircraft, taking up valuable external 
area; 
- Unable to pick up objects lacking some type of heat 
signature (cables or gliders); 
- Development and integration would be very costly. 
• Microwave Radar (MMW Radar): 
- Very mature technology; 
- Detect intruder aircraft at great distances; 
- High size and weight. 
• Laser Radar (LIDAR): 
- the size of the cone is very small and it makes possible to 
target a specific obstacle; 
- the revisit rate is poor and it takes multitude of laser sensors 
to achieve the same rate as a microwave radar; 
- extremely underdeveloped; 
- High cost; 
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- Inadequate in adverse weather (light can be absorbed and 
reflected). 
1.4.5 SAA architectures and methods 
During the latest years a great effort has been made, by industry and 
agencies in order to identify a technological solution that could satisfy an 
equivalent level of safety of manned aircraft. In the following, a review on the 
available SAA system architectures and algorithms is presented. 
Regarding the “sense” function, for a sense-and-avoid system on UAVs, 
MIT Lincoln Laboratory developed the Airborne Sense and Avoid (ABSAA) 
Radar panel which is an unique light-weight sensor performing quick and 
repeatable scanning of the search region. The radar solution meets the all-weather 
and day/night requirements [33] - [34].This prototyping effort was focused on the 
General Atomics Predator B which nominally could carry 2 or 3 separate radar 
arrays to cover a total of 220° in azimuth and 30° in elevation [35]. Others radar 
approaches for the sense function can be found in [36] and [37]. In the first a 
prototype radar, for mini-UAV, is presented. This radar is able to differentiate 
other miniature rotorcraft by their Doppler signature. Moreover a performance 
analysis related to the signature matching algorithms is presented. The second 
introduces a radar technology and shows the test that have been performed in 
order to evaluate the performance of a digital beam forming concept associated 
with flood light illumination: it allows combining wide angle coverage, high 
velocity resolution, and high refresh rate. 
Several different approaches have been considered in literature for vision-
based flying object detection, ranging from optical flow to morphological filtering 
[38]. An emerging technologies based on the Active Electronically Scanned Array 
(AESA) couple the radar-based technology and EO systems: the EO system scans 
and records images while the radar is shifting through its various modes [39]. 
A visual approach is proposed by Zarandy A. et al. in [40]: their prototype 
uses 5 pieces of 1.2 Megapixel miniature cameras, an FPGA board with a Spartan 
6 (XC6SLX45T), and a 128Gbyte Solid-State Disk drive for recording raw video 
data. The paper focus on image processing algorithms and it proves that the 
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designed system is able to identify 10 meter sized aircraft from at least 2000 
meters under regular daylight image conditions.  
Another vision-based approach is proposed by Fasano et al. in [41]: the 
obstacle detection and track confirmation are based on morphological filtering and 
on a local image analysis. The tracking is performed through a Kalman Filter in 
order to establish aircraft position and velocity. The proposed technique has been 
tested using flight data gathered in a sense and avoid research project carried out 
by the Italian Aerospace Research Center (CIRA) and the Department of 
Industrial Engineering of the university of Naples “Federico II” 
Two devices based on electro-optical systems, in order to perform the 
“sense” function for a sense-and-avoid module, are reported in [42] and [43]. 
A trade analysis of EO sensors, used to provide a sense and avoid capability 
for Global Hawk, is reported in [44]. It is assumed that Global Hawk has three 
cameras, whose coverage do not overlap, that provide a FOV of ±100° by ±15°. 
The analysis suggested that the EO system is suitable for detecting larger aircraft 
but may not be ideal for detecting smaller aircraft with enough lead time for 
Global Hawk to avoid them. 
Detection and tracking strategies based on acoustic array can be found in 
[45]÷[47]. These systems use array of microphones located on board an aircraft 
and a combination of narrow and broad band processing techniques to 
characterize the temporal variation of the received tone of an approaching aircraft 
and estimate its propeller blade rate, together with its speed and the time and 
distance to the closest point of approach. 
Scientific Applications and Research Associates, Inc. (SARA) proposed an 
acoustic sensor for use on small UAVs. The Passive Acoustic Non-cooperative 
Collision Alert System (PANCAS) is characterized by a series of microphones 
mounted in order to compute bearing information for sound at each frequency. A 
proprietary algorithm is considered in order to minimize false alarms, due to fixed 
and random errors (atmospheric effects, wind effects, signal processing errors), 
and to determine the threshold to apply a collision avoidance manoeuver [48]. 
The sense-and-avoid system proposed by Ramasamy S. et al. (2014) [49] 
considers cooperative and non-cooperative sensors and it includes: 
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• Visual camera; 
• Thermal camera; 
• Lidar; 
• MMW Radar; 
• Acoustic Sensors; 
• Transponder; 
• ADS-B; 
• TCAS/ACAS. 
The avionic sensors and sensor decision tree is reported in Figure 1.2. 
 
 
Figure 1.2- Avionic Sensors and Sensor Decision Tree proposed by Ramasamy S. et al [49]  
 
Referring to non-cooperative sensors an high level tracking detection is 
performed by using a Kalman filter starting from the continuous cameras 
detection and range information provided by LIDAR. The Track-To-Track (T3) 
algorithm is used for sensor fusion. This method combines the estimates instead 
of the observation from different sensors. The ADS-B system is used to obtain the 
state of the intruders and an Interacting Multiple Model (IMM) algorithm is 
considered for data fusion [50]. The risk of collision is, then, evaluated 
considering the probability of a near mid-air event for the predicted trajectory 
over the time horizon by employing Monte Carlo approximations. Finally the 
Chapter 1                                                        Survey on Sense And Avoid Systems  
 
18 
 
volume that must be avoided by the host UAV can be obtained computing and 
combining the navigation and tracking error ellipsoids. 
Another multi-sensor data integration for an autonomous sense-and-avoid 
system is reported in [51] and [52]. The suite of SAA sensors used is shown in 
Figure 1.3. The proposed system is called Multi-Sensor Integrated Conflict 
Avoidance (MuSICA) and the data integration is performed by an Extended 
Kalman Filter (EKF) and a measurements-to-track association. The collision 
avoidance algorithm is called Jointly Optimal Conflict Avoidance (JOCA) and it 
computes an optimal avoidance manoeuvre considering hierarchical constraints in 
order to make the maneuver as human-like as possible. JOCA hierarchical 
constraints are reported in Figure 1.4. 
 
 
Figure 1.3 - SAA sensors proposed by Chen R. H. et al. in [51] 
 
 
Figure 1.4 - JOCA hierarchical constraint as proposed by Graham S. et al. in [52] 
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In [53] a SAA algorithm based on the Laser Obstacle Avoidance Marconi 
(LOAM) system is proposed. LOAM system, developed and tested by SELEX-ES 
and the Italian Air Force Research and Flight Test Centre [30], is a low-
weight/volume navigation aid system for rotary-wing/UA platform specially 
designed to detect potentially dangerous obstacles placed in or nearby the flight 
trajectory and to provide the crew with warnings and information of the detected 
obstacles. A laser beam scans periodically the area around the flight trajectory in 
the FOV and using a dedicated signal processing algorithms, optimized for low-
level obstacle detection, the system provides obstacle shapes. Measurements 
uncertainties are taken into account, adding a Gaussian error to every data and 
computing a statistic of the position error for obstacles near and far from the 
aircraft. If a collision risk is established by the impact warning processing, a 
collision avoidance maneuver is computed having the smaller possible correction 
and which is compatible with a safe flight plan. Here too, an ellipsoidal avoidance 
volume is associated to the obstacle considering the two-sigma standard deviation 
of the total obstacle detection and tracking errors.  
A SAA algorithm based on the surveillance data provided by electro-optical 
sensors and an airborne radar can be found in [54]. The conflict detection criterion 
is based on the definition of the closest point of approach and the resolution 
maneuver is computed considering the minimum variation from the original path. 
In particular, the collision volume is assumed to be spherical and the resolution 
maneuver is computed considering the tangent to that sphere. The sphere radius is 
related to the Near Mid-Air Collision (NMAC) parameter as defined in [55]: “A 
Near Mid-Air Collision is defined as an incident associated with the operation of 
an aircraft in which a possibility of collision occurs as a result of proximity of less 
than 500 feet to another aircraft, or a report is received from a pilot or a flight 
crew member stating that a collision hazard existed between two or more aircraft”. 
A sense-and-avoid system, which uses an ADS-B Transceiver, is reported in 
[56]-[57]. The collision detection algorithm considers the GPS position obtained 
by the ADS-B device and a threat is declared if an aircraft or a fixed obstacle is 
predicted to enter a collision or near collision course with the ownship aircraft 
within a certain time frame. The collision avoidance algorithm considers a 
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behavior-based approach derived from a guidance method developed for 
unmanned maritime vehicles. In particular, it represent a multi-objective 
optimization problems using a set of behavior that may include “Reach Target”, 
“Avoid Small Threats”, “Avoid Large Threats” and “Follow Right-of-Way 
Rules”. These behaviors may or may not produce objective functions for which a 
priority weighting is assigned. Objective function are defined considering a set of 
explicit constraints constructs representing the dynamic characteristics of the 
UAV: horizontal velocity, vertical velocity, and direction. Note that the behaviors 
are based on the closest point of approach. Hence, the sense-and-avoid algorithm 
uses interval programming (IvP) methods to balance objective functions for each 
behavior [58]. Concerning the avoidance volume computation, one possible 
assumption considers the turning and climb-descendent performance, creating a 
cylindrical volume. Another solution is to use time-based thresholds based on the 
definition of tau parameter [19]. 
A range-based method used to create dynamic alerting thresholds is reported 
in [59]. The relative dynamics of the incoming aircraft and the “sense” feature, are 
assumed to be evaluated through the ADS-B system. The alerting thresholds are 
defined based on the geometric relationship of the encounter and the UAV’s 
maneuvering ability and the four kinds of alarms include: “Dangerously Close”, 
“Perform Maneuver”, ”Vertical Maneuver” and “Super Maneuver Only”. 
A collision avoidance approach, based on the conflict probing is presented 
in [60]. Conflict probing consists of predicting the future separation between 
ownship and hazards for a set of ownship velocity vectors, up to a predefined 
prediction horizon. The probing data indicates which velocity vectors will lead to 
a future conflict and the related time to conflict. Conflict probing can provide a 
common framework for the computation of coordinated conflict avoidance 
maneuvers that include integration of multiple types of hazards and constraints 
such as vehicle performance and right-of-way rules. 
Another approach relying on the use of ADS-B data for trajectory prediction 
and conflict detection is proposed in [61]. The methodology addresses the 
problem from a probabilistic point of view aimed to assess the conflict probability  
based on the approximation of the conflict zone by a set of blocks. 
Chapter 1                                                        Survey on Sense And Avoid Systems  
 
21 
 
The Mid-Air Collision Avoidance (MIDCAS) Project proposes a SAA 
system based on the data coming from a set of sensors comprising EO, IR, Radar, 
ADS-B and Transponder. The collision volume can be defined in two ways, 
starting from the NMAC parameter: the first one defines the collision volume as a 
spheroid with vertical half axis of 350 ft, and horizontal half-axis of 500 ft; the 
second defines the collision volume as a cylindrical volume centered on the UAV 
with a horizontal radius of 500 ft and a vertical height of 200 ft. the system shows 
threats information display and it computes an automated collision avoidance 
maneuver [62]. 
Finally, in Europe, the general aviation and UAVs are currently 
experiencing the introduction of other and cheaper cooperative means for conflict 
detection (as alternative to TCAS), such as FLARM [63]. Each FLARM device 
evaluates its position and altitude with a high precision GPS receiver. Based on 
other information, such as speed, acceleration, heading, track, a flight plan can be 
calculated and sent over a radio channel to all nearby aircraft equipped with 
FLARM too. Therefore, a motion prediction algorithm calculates a collision risk 
for each received aircraft based on an integrated risk model. The FLARM device 
gives the alerts to the pilot which can take resolutive actions. The newer FLARM 
incorporates a very accurate ADS-B and transponder (SSR) Mode-C/S receiver in 
order to include all the transponder equipped aircraft in the collision prediction 
algorithm. 
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Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Broadcast  
 
2.1 Introduction 
The Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Broadcast (ADS-B) is a, 
relatively, new technology that has been under development several years before 
its recent adoption [64]. This technology was, actually, developed for support air 
traffic controllers improving the manned aircraft situational awareness: it was 
intended to replace the primary and secondary surveillance radars. However, it 
also appeared as a potential solution for the sense and avoid issue in UAVs. 
2.2 ADS-B Description 
The Automatic Dependent Surveillance - Broadcast is a cooperative 
surveillance technology. There are two main services related to this technology:  
• ADS-B OUT service supports the air traffic data transmission 
between the aircraft and the ATC; 
• ADS-B IN service supports the aircraft data transmission between 
the aircraft themselves. 
The aircraft equipped with ADS-B OUT technology compute their own 
precise position through satellite-based GPS and automatically transmit these 
parameters. The information are broadcasted via a radio-link and can be received 
by ground operators or other aircraft equipped with ADS-B IN technology. The 
FAA identified two links for the transmission of data: 
• Universal Access Transceiver (UAT) for general aviation users that 
operates at 978 MHz UHF frequency; 
• 1090 MHz Mode S Extended Squitter (ES) for private or commercial 
operators. 
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The UAT data link is approved by FAA for use in all airspace except class 
A (above 18000 ft) and it is intended to support also other services such as Flight 
Information Service – Broadcast (FIS-B) and Traffic Information Service – 
Broadcast (TIS-B). In this way UAT users can receive ground-based aeronautical 
data (FIS-B) and reports from proximate traffic (TIS-B) through a multilink 
gateway service that provides ADS-B reports for 1090ES-equipped aircraft and 
non-ADS-B equipped radar traffic. This physical layer is now available only in 
U.S. [65]. Moreover, through the ADS-R ground station it is possible to obtain on 
the UAT link the data of aircraft transmitting on 1090 MHz link and vice versa: 
messages are crosslink translated from UAT to 1090ES and from 1090ES to UAT 
[66]. 
The existing mode S transponder supports a message type known as the 
Extended Squitter (ES) message that may includes ADS-B data. ATC ground 
station and aircraft equipped with TCAS already have the Mode S receiver and it 
would be enhanced in order to support the ES information exchange according to 
the TSO C–166B [67]. The technical link standards 1090ES does not support FIS-
B service due to the bandwidth limitations of ES. In Europe there is not a physical 
layer for ADS-B and only the 1090ES link is used. 
In both forms the position is updated, at least, once per second. There are 
many benefits related to the introduction of ADS-B including the followings [68]: 
• ADS-B implementation improves situational awareness of pilots and 
air traffic controllers improving the shared information about the 
surrounding traffic; 
• Aircraft that uses UAT link can receive weather reports and weather 
radar through FIS-B data; 
• Aircraft that uses either UAT or 1090ES link can obtain NOTAMs 
and others flight information; 
• ADS-B ground stations are cheaper compared to primary and 
secondary radar systems; 
• ADS-B IN device is able to indicate traffic information with respect 
to targets that may be located up to even 200 nautical miles far 
awayfrom the device [69]. 
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2.3 ADS-B Messages and Reports 
This section describes the information broadcasted through ADS-B OUT 
devices according to REF DO-338 [67]. In the following it will be referred to 
ADS-B Message to indicate a block of data, that is formatted and transmitted, 
containing the information elements used to create ADS-B reports. On the other 
hand, an ADS-B Report contains the information elements, assembled by an 
ADS-B receiver, using messages received from a transmitting participant. Among 
all types of reports that may be assembled by the ADS-B IN device the followings 
will be considered: 
• The Mode Status (MS) report contains operational information about 
the transmitting participant; 
• The State Vector (SV) report contains information about an aircraft 
current kinematic state. 
Reports may contain the following information: 
1) Time of Applicability (TOA): it indicates the time at which the 
reported values were valid. Time of Applicability is provided in all 
reports. Note that the Time of Applicability of position 
measurements (TOAp) may differ from the Time of Applicability of 
velocity measurements (TOAv). The TOA field contains always the 
TOAp. Also TOAp and TOAv are transmitted in SV report. 
2) Identification: 
- Call Sign/Flight ID: it is a message of 8 alphanumeric characters. 
For aircraft not receiving ATS services and military aircraft it is 
not required. It is reported in the MS report. 
- Participant Address and Address Qualifier: this message is 
necessary to differentiate a message transmitted by an A/V from 
another A/V. Aircraft with Mode-S transponders using ICAO 24 
bit address shall use the same one for ADS-B; another kind of 
address is used otherwise. All A/Vs addresses must be unique in 
the operational domain. The Address Qualifier message indicates 
if the Address field contains the 24-bit ICAO address or another 
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kind of address. Both Participant Address and Address Qualifier 
are included in all ADS-B Reports. 
- ADS-B Emitter Category: it is included in MS Report and it 
describes the type of A/V (i.e. Light, Small Aircraft, Large 
Aircraft). 
- Mode 3/A Code: the ADS-B Transmitting Subsystem may have 
the capability to disable the transmission of this information. The 
broadcast of this information is only a transitional feature to 
support ATC automation systems but may be removed in future. 
3) A/V Length and Width Codes: these messages describe the amount 
of space that an aircraft occupies. They are required to be transmitted 
by aircraft above a certain size and they are included in the MS 
report. 
4) Position (it is included in the SV Report) 
- Geometric position referenced to the WGS-84 ellipsoid 
characterized by: 
o Horizontal position (latitude and longitude); 
o Geometric Height. 
- Barometric Pressure Altitude; 
5) Horizontal Velocity: 
- Ground-referenced or geometric velocity: it is communicated in 
the SV Report; 
- Air-Referenced Velocity (ARV): it is communicate in the Air-
Referenced Velocity report (out of the scope of this work); 
6) Vertical Rate: it is reported in the SV Report. One of the two types 
of vertical rate (barometric and geometric) it is reported and it is 
obtained from the best source.  
7) Heading: it indicates the orientation of A/V and it is described as an 
angle measured clockwise from magnetic north or true north ( the 
reference direction is reported in the MS Report). The heading is 
communicated in the SV Report and in the ARV report. 
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8) Capability Class (CC) Code – used to indicate the capabilities of a 
transmitting ADS-B participant:  
- TCAS/ACAS Operational: the CC code shall be set to one if 
the TCAS/ACAS system is operational, otherwise it shall be set 
to zero; 
- 1090 MHz ES Receiver Capability: the CC code for “1090ES 
IN” shall be set to one if the transmitting aircraft has the 
capability to receive ADS-B 1090ES Messages, otherwise zero; 
- ARV Report Capability Flag; 
- Target State (TS) Report Capability Flag; 
- Trajectory Change (TC) Report Capability Level; 
- UAT Receive Capability: the CC code for “UAT IN” shall be 
set to zero if the aircraft is not fitted with the capability to 
receive ADS-B UAT Messages; otherwise one; 
- Other Capability Codes are expected to be defined in later 
versions of the MASPS. 
9) Operational Mode (OM) Codes – used to indicate the current 
operating mode of a transmitting ADS-B participant. 
- TCAS/ACAS Resolution Advisory Active Flag: the CC code 
for “TCAS/ACAS Resolution Advisory Active” shall be set to 
zero i  it is certain that the TCAS II or ACAS computer is not 
issuing a Resolution Advisory (RA); otherwise one. 
- IDENT Switch: it is a one-bit field that is activated by an 
IDENT switch. This flag shall be set to one for a period of 20±3 
seconds, after it shall be reset to zero. 
- Reserved For Receiving ATC Services Flag: it a one-bit OM 
code and if it set to one indicates that the aircraft is receiving 
ATC services; otherwise it is set to zero; 
- Other Operational Mode Codes are expected to be defined in 
later versions of the MASPS. 
10) Navigation Integrity Category (NIC): it specifies an integrity 
containment region. It is related to the Source Integrity Level (SIL) 
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that specifies the probability of the reports horizontal position 
exceeding the containment radius defined by the NIC without 
alerting, assuming no avionics faults. It is reports in the SV Report. 
11) Navigation Accuracy Category for Position (NACp): it is used to 
describe the accuracy of position information in ADS-B Messages 
and it reported in the MS Report. 
12) Navigation Accuracy Category for Velocity (NACv): it is used to 
describe the accuracy of velocity information in ADS-B Messages 
and it reported in the MS Report. 
13) Source Integrity Level (SIL): it specifies the probability of the 
reports horizontal position exceeding the containment radius defined 
by the NIC without alerting, assuming no avionics faults. This 
probability is covered by the System Design Assurance (SDA) 
parameter.  
14) Barometric Altitude Integrity Code (NICBARO): it is a one-bit flag 
that indicates if the barometric pressure altitude, in the SV Report, 
has been cross-checked against another source of pressure altitude. 
The NICBARO value is reported in the MS Report. 
15) Emergency/Priority status: it is reported in MS Report. 
16) Geometric Vertical Accuracy (GVA):it is a 2-bit field and it shall be 
set by using the Vertical Figure of Merit (VFOM)(95%) from the 
GNSS source used to report the geometric altitude. 
17) TACAS/ACAS Resolution Advisory (RA) Data Block: the message 
subfields are specified in RTCA DO-185B [19]. 
18) ADS-B Version Number: it is a 3-bit field that specify the ADS-B 
Transmitting Subsystem Version. 
19) Selected Altitude Type: it is a 1-bit field used to indicate the source 
of Selected Altitude data. 
20) MCP/FCU (Mode Control Panel/Flight Control Unit) or FMS (Flight 
Management System) Selected Altitude Field: it is an 11-bit field 
that shall contain either MCP/FCU Selected Altitude or FMS 
Selected Altitude. 
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21) Barometric Pressure Setting (Minus 800 millibars) Field; 
22) Selected Heading Status Field; 
23) Selected Heading Sign Field; 
24) Selected Heading Field; 
25) State of MCP/FCU Mode Bits; 
26) Mode Indicator: Autopilot Engaged Field: it is a 1-bit field that is set 
to zero if the Autopilot in not Engaged or Unknown; otherwise it is 
set to one. 
27) Mode Indicator: VNAV (Vertical Navigation) Mode Engaged Field: 
it is a 1-bit field that is set to zero if the VNAV Mode is not Active 
or Unknown; otherwise it is set to one. 
28) Mode Indicator: Altitude Hold Mode Field: it is a 1-bit field that is 
set to zero if the Altitude Hold Mode is not Active or Unknown; 
otherwise it is set to one. 
29) Mode Indicator: Approach Mode Field: it is a 1-bit field that is set to 
zero if the Approach Mode is not Active or Unknown; otherwise it is 
set to one. 
30) Mode Indicator: LNAV (Lateral Navigation) Mode Field: it is a 1-bit 
field that is set to zero if the LNAV Mode is not Active or Unknown; 
otherwise it is set to one. 
31) Single Antenna Flag (SAF): it is a 1-bit field that indicates if the 
ADS-B transmitting Subsystem is operating with a single antenna 
(the field is then set to one, otherwise to zero). The conventions shall 
be applied both to Transponder-Based and Stand Alone ADS-B 
Transmitting Subsystem. 
32) System Design Assurance: it is a 2-bit field that shall define the 
failure condition that the position transmission chain is designed to 
support. 
33) GPS Antenna Offset: it is an 8-bit field that define the position of the 
GPS antenna in accordance with: 
- Lateral Axis GPS Antenna Offset shall be used to encode the 
lateral distance of the GPS Antenna from the longitudinal axis; 
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- Longitudinal Axis GPS Antenna Offset shall be used to encode 
the longitudinal distance of the GPS Antenna from the NOSE 
of the Aircraft. 
2.4 ADS-B Regulations 
The use of ADS-B in the U.S. NAS for surveillance application has been 
regulated by FAA in 2010 with some amendments to Part 91 [70]. In particular 
the FAA published the Final Rule for ADS-B Out equipage and it mandates 
performance requirements for ADS-B avionics that will be required to fly in 
certain airspace by 1th January 2020. Note that this rule does not mandate ADS-B 
IN device: a new Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC) was expected in June 
2010 to decide ADS-B IN strategy. The designed frequencies are: 
• 1090 MHz Extended Squitter (1090ES) for commercial aircraft and 
for all aircraft flying in Class A airspace (Flight Level 180 and 
above); 
• Universal Access Transceiver 978 MHz (UAT) for general aviation 
and airport vehicles. 
The final rule defines also the airspace where the ADS-B OUT will be 
mandated. 
Since 2009, several standards and guidance have been published. 
Regarding ICAO documents there are: 
• ICAO DOC 9871 Technical Provisions for Mode S Services and 
External Squitter [71]; 
• ICAO DOC 9861 Manual on the Universal Access Transceiver 
(UAT) [72]. 
The FAA provided the following Advisory Circulars: 
• AC 20-165 Airworthiness Approval of Automatic Dependent 
Surveillance - Broadcast (ADS-B) Out Systems [73]; 
• AC 90-114 Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) 
Operations [74]; 
• AC 150/5220-26 Airport Ground Vehicle Automatic Dependent 
Surveillance – Broadcast (ADS-B) Out Squitter Equipment [75]; 
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• AC 20-172A Airworthiness Approval for ADS-B In Systems and 
Applications [76]. 
The Technical Standard Order relate to the ADS-B service are: 
• TSO-C166b Extended Squitter Automatic Dependent Surveillance - 
Broadcast (ADS-B) and Traffic Information Service - Broadcast 
(TIS-B) Equipment Operating on the Radio Frequency of 1090 
Megahertz (MHz) [67]; 
• TSO-C154c, Universal Access Transceiver (UAT) Automatic 
Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B) Equipment Operating 
on Frequency of 978 MHz [77]; 
• TSO-C195a, Avionics Supporting Automatic Dependent 
Surveillance – Broadcast (ADS-B) Aircraft Surveillance 
Applications (ASA) [78]; 
Concerning the RTCA documents there are: 
• RTCA DO-260B Minimum Operational Performance Standards for 
1090 MHz Extended Squitter Automatic Dependent Surveillance - 
Broadcast (ADS-B) and Traffic Information Services - Broadcast 
(TIS-B) [79]; 
• RTCA DO-282B Minimum Operational Performance Standards for 
Universal Access Transceiver (UAT) Automatic Dependent 
Surveillance - Broadcast (ADS-B) [80]; 
• RTCA DO-317B Minimum Operational Performance Standards 
(MOPS) for Aircraft Surveillance Applications (ASA) System [81]; 
• RTCA DO-249 Development and Implementation Planning Guide 
for Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B) 
Applications [82]; 
• RTCA DO-242A Minimum Aviation System Performance Standards 
for Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B) [83]; 
• RTCA DO-338 Minimum Aviation System Performance Standards 
(MASPS) for ADS-B Traffic Surveillance Systems and Applications 
(ATSSA) [66]; 
These and others documents can be found in [84]. 
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ADSB-Out application in the Europe has been regulated with UE 1207/2011 [85]. 
 
2.5 Realities and Challenges in ADS-B system 
Starting from 2020 FAA, as well as EUROCONTROL, have mandated 
ADS-B OUT in all aircraft as part of next generation air transportation systems 
NextGen and SESAR. The employment of such a system may lead several 
advantages such as [86]: 
• Optimization of runway control/taxing improving the handling of 
aircraft on the ground (their position is known with high precision); 
• Improvement of accuracy and ATC safety during take-off and 
landing; 
• Reduction of mid-air collision risk; 
• Introduction of UAV in NAS permitting the SAA function with high 
precision. 
Nevertheless, a lot of challenges still remains related to the integration of 
ADS-B system.  
An analysis carried out by Strohmeier et al. in [87], identified two relevant 
problems: 
• In dense airspace the ADS-B system is affected by message 
collisions, especially when only the 1090 MHz link is used (i.e. in 
Europe). The message collisions causes the most high loss rate: with 
few aircraft the loss rate is of about 10 percent but it rises over 45 
percent with 60 ADS-B transmitter participants. This is due to the 
fact that not only Ads-B operates on 1090 MHz link and a solution 
would be improving the channel capacity. 
• There are security issues related to ADS-B. In fact, ADS-B is an 
open-source and it is susceptible to radio frequency attack as 
reported in [88]÷[90]. For example it is possible to modify the 
aircraft virtual trajectory, delete all ADS-B messages sent by a 
particular aircraft or modify the identifier of a particular aircraft. 
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A solution to these problems can be found in [91]: a means to increase the 
bandwidth capacity, through a modification of access and access protocol, is 
proposed together with a means for protection of flight path in terms of 
authentication and encryption on the data link. 
Further analysis on the limitations of the ADS-B technology for the 
application on unmanned aerial systems has been carried out in [92], where the 
use of ADS-B based only surveillance on-board of small remotely piloted vehicles 
is considered not suitable and the fusion with electro-optical sensors is suggested 
as mostly mandatory. 
More in particular a detailed analysis on the challenges related to a SAA 
system based on the displayed ADS-B data is reported in [93]. First of all 
requirements on the position quality have to been established. In fact, although 
some performance requirements are stated in DO-317B for some application, such 
as the enhanced visual acquisition, the performance for a SAA system must have 
superior. Moreover, the position information will not be available for aircraft not 
equipped with ADS-B or from aircraft that do not meet accuracy and integrity 
requirements. Also the data coming from the ground stations suffers problems 
such as availability, that may be limited in several ways, and low quality related 
mostly on the rebroadcast of data. Also the ADS-B receiver and message 
processing requirements have to be defined with an high level of design in order 
to assure the required level of safety. Finally also the availability and quality of 
ownship data and the Surveillance Processing are critical in the use of ADS-B 
data because all the surveillance and the relevant ownship data comes together to 
be processed for display and application-specific functions. Requirements have to 
be defined too. Nevertheless, it is reported that “The FAA has plans to expand the 
capability of ADS-B to include more advanced applications using delegated 
separation and/or collision avoidance. […] This work plan recognizes the need for 
development of increasingly complex ADS-B traffic applications from “Traffic 
Situation Awareness with Alerts” to “ADS-B Integrated Collision Avoidance” 
and even “Self Separation””. 
Capitolo 3                                                            System and Software Architecture                             
 
33 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 3  
System Description 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The ADS-B surveillance data can be used as input for conflict detection 
algorithms in order to support future self-separation as well as collision avoidance 
systems. In particular the proposed conflict detection algorithm is based on the 
received data, of all ADS-B Out equipped aircraft, by the on-board ADS-B In 
device.  
The overall proposed system architecture aims to manage the ADS-B raw 
data in order to provide the on-board application, with an usable structured 
database with all the available information about the surrounding traffic. The such 
obtained information is sent to a conflict detection algorithm and, subsequently, 
the tracks are prioritized in terms of the most relevant threat. The obtained data 
can be send to a CDTI display to support the pilot, incrementing the situational 
awareness, or can be used for conflict resolution algorithms. 
It is worth to note that, the proposed system, for tests scope, has been 
involved in a conflict resolution architecture for an unmanned aircraft but, as 
mentioned before, it can be used also in manned applications. The conflict 
resolution module is out of the scope of this work. 
In order to test the developed system a model of the software has been 
implemented in Matlab and Simulink R2009A. 
 
3.2 Software Architecture description 
The functional architecture of the proposed system is reported in Figure 3.1. 
The four main module are: 
• Surveillance Processing Module; 
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• Coarse Filter Module;
• Conflict Detection Module;
• Prioritization Module.
The ADS-B IN incoming data are sent
generate a traffic database, containing information such as position, velocity ad 
participant address, with a number 
subject to a pre-filter in order to delete from the database the aircraft which are too 
far away from ownship (more details are shown in the following), reducing the 
number of tracks in the database to 
detection module evaluates which ones represent a conflict to the ownship leading 
to P, the number of relevant tracks. Also in this case the number of aircraft 
be equal to N. Finally, a prioritization module gives
relevant threat. 
 
 
3.3 Surveillance Processing
The Surveillance Processing module i
data coming from the ADS
usable by on-board applications
navigation data and traffic ADS
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 to a Surveillance Module that 
M of multiple targets. The obtained data are 
N. Among all the obtained track
 information 
Figure 3.1 – Architecture of the Proposed System 
 algorithm 
s in charge of re-elaborating
-B In device in order to create an air traffic
. In other words, starting from 
-B broadcasted information, it is possible to 
                             
s, the conflict 
P can 
about the most 
 
 the raw 
 database 
the ownship 
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generate a traffic state file database easily usable by the pilot or other applications. 
The implemented Surveillance Processing functionalities are based on RTCA-
317A Appendix C specifications [94] but they are adapted to be useful in the 
framework of the particular application under study. Figure 3.2 shows a functional 
architecture of Surveillance Processing. 
Considering that: 
• only the 1090MHz communication link is enabled (the only link 
available in Europe); 
• the ADS-R and TIS-B reports are not available; 
 the following functionalities are implemented: 
• Track Generation and Maintenance; 
• Track Termination; 
• Common Time Track Extrapolation; 
• Traffic State File Generation. 
Figure 3.2 shows an high level Simulink Architecture of Surveillance 
Processing. 
 
 
Figure 3.2 – Surveillance Processing Architecture 
 
3.3.1 Track Generation and Maintenance 
Track Generation and Maintenance module is responsible for track 
initiation and subsequent updates.  
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The module operates differently based on the received report type. 
Upon a reception of a Mode Status report,  the module searches, into a 
database, for a stored track with the same 24-bit address: 
• If no match is found the report shall be discarded; 
• If a match is found NACp, NACv, and SIL values, and the other variables 
related to Mode Status report, in the track shall be updated with the values 
in the report. 
The logic adopted when a State Vector report is received, is shown in high level 
flow chart in  
Figure 3.3 - SV report reception - high level flow chart of generation and maintenance module 
 .  
Upon a reception of a State Vector report, the module search for a stored track 
with the same 24-bit address as the report; there are two possible ways to operate: 
1. If no match is found a new track could be generated. To generate a new 
track, the sentences a. and b. shall be both verified: 
a. The measurements in the reports shall be valid: 
i. if the target is airborne, the validity flags of Geometric 
Altitude, Horizontal Position, Vertical Rate and Horizontal 
Velocity are considered;  
ii. if the target is on the ground the validity flags of Geometric 
Altitude, Horizontal Position, and Ground Speed are 
considered; 
b.  Two consecutive reports of the same track shall correlate: upon 
the reception of a new report, the latter is recorded but not stored 
into the database. If a consecutively incoming report correlates 
with the first, according to the same validation and correlation 
criterion used for the updating of a track into the database and 
discussed in the following, the new track is generated and stored 
into the database. Otherwise, the first report is discarded and the 
incoming one is recorded without generating a new track. 
When a new track is generated track it is automatically validated and can be 
considered as reference track for the  incoming new reports. 
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2. If a match is found, and the track has been previously validated, the 
validity of the incoming report is checked, as shown in paragraph 3.3.1.1.  
If the report validity checks are passed, the module could update an 
existing track state component  through the state assembly function, 
otherwise the report is rejected. 
The assembly function could generate a filtered state vector through 
position or velocity measurements: 
• if the target position measurements and velocity measurements are 
valid the generation and maintenance module could update the state 
vector through position or velocity measurements based on the most 
recent measurement; 
• if the target position measurements are valid but the Velocity 
Measurements are invalid, the module could generate an assembled 
state vector through position measurements; 
• if the target Velocity Measurements are valid but the Position 
measurements are invalid, the module could generate an assembled 
state vector through velocity measurements. 
In any of the previous cases, to effectively generate an assembled state 
vector, the measurement time of applicability, of the position or velocity 
depending on the case, shall be greater than the time of applicability of the 
stored track but lower than the time of applicability of ownship 
measurement data. Simultaneously the assembled state vector calculation, 
also the assembled uncertainties are computed on the basis of the 
uncertainties related to the measurements and the ones related to the stored 
track. The state filtering equation are presented in the paragraphs 3.3.1.2.2 
and 0. It is worth nothing that, when a match is found the stored track 
position and velocity are extrapolated to the time of applicability of the 
incoming report according to the paragraph 3.3.1.2. 
If none of the previous condition is verifies the report is discarded and it is 
not considered for update. 
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Once the assembled state vector has been computed, the track update is 
performed if spatial correlation occurs, detailed equations can be found in 
paragraph 3.3.1.3.  
 
 
 
Figure 3.3 - SV report reception - high level flow chart of generation and maintenance module 
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Therefore, if spatial correlation occurs the module updates the track and in 
particular the state vector and uncertainties with the assembled state and 
assembled uncertainties, the time of applicability of the stored track with 
the time of applicability used to generate the assembled state, and all the 
other variables related to the State Vector report with the values in the 
report.  
If spatial correlation fails the state vector report is discarded. 
 
3.3.1.1 Reports validity checks 
The performed report validity checks are different based on the indication of 
validity flag of the incoming measurements: 
1. If position measurements and velocity measurements are valid the module 
performs an horizontal velocity validation, an horizontal position 
validation and a vertical position validation.  
2. If the report contains only valid position measurements the horizontal 
position validation and vertical position validation are performed.  
3. Finally if only velocity measurements are valid the horizontal velocity 
validation is performed.  
The report validation criteria, according to RTCA 317 [94] Appendix D, are the 
following. 
 
Horizontal velocity validation 
TAVVV u ⋅+⋅<− 201   (1)  
Where, considering an ENU reference frame: 
• 0V  is the last validated velocity on the horizontal plane; 
• 1V  is the velocity on the horizontal plane, contained in the report to be 
validated; 
• uV  is the velocity uncertainty; 
• A  is assumed to be 14.7 m/s2 as reported in [94] Appendix D; 
• T  is the time difference between the incoming report and the last validated 
velocity report. 
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Horizontal position validation 
( ) 25.024 TATVVKD u ⋅⋅+⋅⋅++⋅<   (2)  
Where, considering an ENU reference frame: 
• D  is the horizontal distance between the last validated position and the 
one contained in the report to be validated; 
• K  is the horizontal position uncertainty at 95%; 
• V  is the magnitude of reported velocity; 
• uV , A  are the same of above; 
• T  is the time difference between the incoming report and the last validated 
position report. 
 
Vertical position validation 
60
1000025001
TfpmftAA ⋅+<−  
 (3)  
Where: 
• 0A  is the last validated altitude; 
• 1A  is the altitude contained in the report to be validated; 
• T  is the time difference between the incoming report and the last validated 
altitude report. 
 
3.3.1.2 State Estimation: the Kalman Filter 
In order to produce an accurate estimation of the track state recorded into 
the database, a Kalman filter is implemented. The filter is based on a constant 
velocity model of the intruders. 
3.3.1.2.1 Prediction 
The stored track position and velocity are predicted to the time of 
applicability of the incoming report according to the Eq.(4). A constant velocity 
dynamic model, for the target, has been adopted but more information about target 
dynamic models can be found in [95]. 
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Where: 
• ( )111 ,, −−− ktktkt zyx  is the position, in local ENU coordinates, of the track 
stored into the database and related to the last update; 
• ( )111 ,, −−− ktktkt zyx &&&  is the velocity, in local ENU coordinates, of the track 
stored into the database and related to the last update; 
• t∆  is the time difference between the report time and the time of the last 
track update. 
Also the covariance matrix is predicted according to the Eq. (5).  
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 (5)  
Where Q is the process noise variance and it is assumed to be 0.065g2 as reported 
in [94] Appendix C.  
The initial covariance matrix can be computed as: 
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 (6)  
Where [96]: 
• epuσ  is the standard deviation of estimated position uncertainty and it is 
derived from NACp according to Table 3.1; 
• vepuσ  is the standard deviation of vertical estimated position uncertainty 
and it is derived from NACp according to Table 3.1; 
• hvaσ  is the standard deviation of horizontale velocity accuracy and it is 
derived from NACv according to Table 3.2; 
• vvaσ  is the standard deviation of vertical velocity accuracy and it is derived 
from NACv according to Table 3.2. 
 
 
Table 3.1 – Navigation Accuracy Category for Position 
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Table 3.2 – Navigation Accuracy Category for velocity 
 
3.3.1.2.2 State Filtering with position updates 
Let us consider the innovation variances computed as follows: 
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where: 
• ( )2
ˆ
2
ˆ
2
ˆ
,, zyx σσσ  are predicted track position variances; 
• epuσ  and vepuσ  are defined as above and related to the measurements 
of the incoming report. 
The filtered state can be computed as follows: 
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where ( )mmm zyx ,,  are the measured positions, and the gain vectors are computed 
as: 
Capitolo 3                                                            System and Software Architecture                             
 
44 
 
2
ˆ
ˆ
12
2
ˆ
0
2
ˆ
ˆ
12
2
ˆ
0
2
ˆ
ˆ
12
2
ˆ
0
;
;
;
zz
yy
xx
zz
y
z
z
yy
y
y
y
xx
x
x
x
kk
kk
kk
νν
νν
νν
σ
σ
σ
σ
σ
σ
σ
σ
σ
σ
σ
σ
&
&
&
==
==
==
 
 (9)  
Also the assembled state covariance matrices are computed according to Eq.10-
12. 
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3.3.1.2.3 State Filtering with velocity updates 
In the case of velocity updates, the innovation variances can be computed as 
follows: 
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 (13)  
where: 
• ( )2
ˆ
2
ˆ
2
ˆ
,,
zyx &&& σσσ  are extrapolated track velocity variances; 
• hvaσ  and vvaσ  are defined as above. 
As in the previous case, it is possible to define the gain vectors as: 
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The filtered status and covariances are computed as shown in Eq. 15-18. 
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where ( )mmm zyx &&& ,,  are the measured velocities. 
 
3.3.1.3 Spatial Correlation 
In order to ensure that the incoming report represents an updated 
measurement of the stored track, a spatial correlation test is performed. The 
spatial correlation window is computed based on an estimated maximum distance 
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between two positions. In particular is possible to estimate the maximum 
horizontal ( hr ) and vertical ( vr ) distances between the filtered and the track 
position; note that in Eq.16 'epuσ  and 'vepuσ  are computed through Table 3.1 using 
NACp-1. 
Therefore, the spatial correlation is proved if hh rd <  and vv rd <  where: 
• ( ) ( )22 yyxxd aah −+−=  is the horizontal distance between filtered 
and track horizontal position; 
• zzd av −=  is the vertical distance between filtered and track 
horizontal position. 
 
3.3.2 Track Termination algorithm 
The Track Termination function deletes from the database, the tracks whose 
time of applicability of the last correlated report is higher than a predefined 
threshold. The threshold used in this application is 15s according to TSAA target 
discontinuation threshold [97]-[98]. 
Moreover, this time interval is the needed time to exit the safety bubble in 
the hypothesis that the intruder aircraft need to cover the max dimension of the 
safety bubble. This statement will be better explained in paragraph 3.5.1. 
 
3.3.3 Common Time Track Extrapolation algorithm 
The Common Time Track Extrapolation function extrapolates all the track, 
recorded into the database, at a common time of applicability. In particular, all the 
tracks are extrapolated at ownship data time of applicability. In this way the 
position and velocities of the surrounding aircraft are updated to the current time 
and can provide the pilot, CDTI or any other application, with the most recent 
data. The extrapolation process is performed assuming that the tracks are moving 
with constant velocity: 
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where: 
• ( )zyx ,,  are the tracks extrapolated positions; 
• ( )zyx &&& ,,  are the tracks extrapolated velocities; 
• dt  is the time difference between the ownship data time of applicability 
and the last updated time of applicability of the tracks. 
 
3.3.4 Traffic state file generation algorithm 
The Traffic state file generation function adapts the database in order to 
remove from database all the information not needed for the specific application 
under study. In other words, among all the information communicated by the 
ADS-B device only a subset is maintained. For this application the saved 
information is: 
• target latitude, longitude and geometric altitude; 
• target Participant address; 
• target north velocity, east velocity and vertical rate; 
• target data time of applicability; 
• number of stored reports. 
 
3.4 Coarse Filtering algorithm 
As mentioned in the previous Chapter, the ADS-B In device can receive 
information about aircraft that may be located vary far from the ownship up to 40 
nautical miles. Of course if the distance is too large the targets should not 
represent a real possible threat for the ownship but in the case of separation and of 
a possible conflict. 
For this reason the Coarse filtering function is in charge to delete from 
database all the aircraft which are far from the ownship more than a predefined 
threshold. However the threshold cannot be excessively reduced due to the need 
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of assuring in any case enough time for the eventual implementation of a 
resolution manoeuver [54]. 
Therefore, the threshold value is computed considering two aircraft with an 
head-on approach geometry and a cruise velocity of 55m/s for each aircraft (this is 
a common value for general aviation). 
Moreover, considering a collision avoidance look ahead time of 35s [99]-
[100], the range threshold is assumed equal to 4000m. 
mRmdtrR T 4000385035110 =→=⋅=⋅= &  
 
3.5 Conflict detection algorithm 
The tracks resulting from the coarse filter module are sent to the Conflict 
detection module which performs the pair-wise check on the conflict condition 
between them and the ownship. The conflict condition applied is based on the 
distance at the closest point of approach ( ABd
r ), between the ownship and the 
specific aircraft, and on the closure rate ( r& ). This criterion is usually used in 
literature [54]. 
The ownship and the intruder are modelled as a point-of-mass object A and 
B respectively, with three degree of freedom and velocity AV
r
 and BV
r
. The 
predicted trajectory of both ownship and intruder, is a straight line propagation 
according to the velocity AV
r
 and BV
r
, respectively. The relative velocity is 
computed as: 
 
BAAB VVV
rrr
−=  
 (21)  
 
The conflict criterion is based on the implementation of a safety bubble 
centred in the intruder aircraft, with a nominal radius set according to FAA 
minimum required safety distance mftR 4.1525000 ≈= . So the intruder aircraft 
became a spherical object centred in the point-of-mass modelling the intruder. 
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Therefore, the implemented conflict condition is:
 
Rd AB <
r
   and   0<r&  
 
where: 
• V
V
Vrd
AB
AB
AB
r
r
rr
r
⋅
= 2
• extraRRR += 0  
in addition a suitable extra size to be determined;
• 
r
Vr
r ABr
rr
&
⋅
= . 
Note that rr  is the position of the intruder in the relative reference system centred 
in the ownship. 
The extra-size radius is introduced in order to take into account the relative 
motion between the ownship and the intruder aircraft, or the uncertainties 
traffic position and velocity measurements. 
the following, in order to compute the extra
method to integrate in the software architecture
reported in the next chapter
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.4 – Ownship-Intruder geometry (Figure extracted from [54]
 
 
 
rAB
r
− ; 
is the safety bubble radius equal to the minimum value with 
 
Two possible way are introduced, in 
-size radius extraR . The choice of the
, will follow the performanc
. 
                             
 
) 
(22)  
about 
 
e test 
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3.5.1 Extra-size Radius computation: time-to-go approach 
The first method proposed for the computation of the safety bubble extra-
size radius, is based on the closure rate r& . In particular the safety bubble radius 
can be computed as: 
 
rkRR &⋅+= 0   (23)  
 
Where k  is a parameter (with time dimension) whose value has to be set. In the 
application under study this value is set to 5s that is a mean value between the 
value used along the horizontal direction (8s) and the vertical direction (2s) in the 
TSAA application [97]. This assumption can be considered valid because the 
safety bubble has been assumed with spherical shape so there are not differences 
along the two directions. 
Note that, considering an head-on conflict geometry between the ownship 
and an intruder aircraft, with both aircraft moving at 55m/s the closure rate is 
smr /110=& . The safety radius is: 
 
mrkRR 70211054.1520 ≈⋅+≈⋅+= &   (24)  
 
Considering that the velocity of the intruder aircraft is 55m/s, it will take 
about 13s to cover 702m. Therefore, in order to be conservative the maximum 
data age for this application, introduced in paragraph 3.3.2, is of 15s. 
 
3.5.2 Extra-size Radius computation: uncertainties approach 
The second method proposed for the computation of the extra-size safety 
bubble is related to the broadcast of two information such as the NACp and NACv 
parameters related to each report. Those parameters give information regarding 
the accuracy of the incoming position and velocity measurements. In particular, 
the horizontal and vertical accuracy (σ ), at 95%, can be computed referring to 
Table 3.1 for what concerns the position measurements, and to Table 3.2 for the 
velocity measurements. 
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In this case the safety radius is defined as: 
 
cpadRR ∆+= σ0   (25)  
 
where 
cpad∆σ  is the variance of cpad  estimate. It possible to verify that the closest 
point of approach can be computed as in Eq. 26. 
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The differential of cpad  is: 
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Where: 
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The variance can be computed as: 
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The values [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]zyxzyx VVVrrr ∆∆∆∆∆∆ var,var,var,var,var,var  can be computed 
with NACp and NACv values through Table 3.1 and Table 3.2. 
 
3.6 Prioritization algorithm 
As result of conflict detection module, multiple conflicts can be detected. In 
fact, more than one aircraft may pose a conflict to the ownship. For this reason a 
proper prioritization criterion has to be implemented. The aim of this module is to 
define the most dangerous vehicle. 
The prioritization criterion is strictly connected to the conflict detection 
algorithm and in particular to the dimensioning of the safety bubble radius. 
Therefore, two possible approaches are presented related to the two safety 
bubble dimensioning introduced above.  
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3.6.1 Prioritization criterion: time-to-go approach 
The first method presents a prioritization criterion based on the closure rate. 
This criterion is a simplification of the ACAS tau parameter evaluation [99]-
[100]. 
In particular, the time-to-go (TTG) parameter is defined as [100]: 
r
rTTG
&
=  
 (32)  
Therefore, the aircraft with lower TTG has higher priority respect to the 
ones with higher TTG. The priority target (PT) is therefore: 
 
( )TTG
r
rPT minmin =
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&
 
 (33)  
 
3.6.2 Prioritization criterion: uncertainties approach 
 As mentioned in paragraph 3.5.2, the safety bubble radius can be computed 
adding to the nominal radius a value equal to the standard deviation of the 
distance at the closest point of approach σ . It is possible to perform the conflict 
detection check with respect to three spheres which surround the intruder aircraft: 
 
σ+= 01 RR  
σ202 += RR  
σ303 += RR  
 (34)  
 
In the hypothesis of normal distribution, it is possible to compute the three 
probabilities of conflict related to three volumes. The first probability is related to 
the sphere with radius: 
 
σ+= 0RR   (35)  
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The second volume is the space included between the sphere at σ1  and the 
one at σ2 . The third volume is included between the sphere at σ2 and the one at 
σ3 . Therefore the conflict probabilities (CP) can be computed as: 
 
{ } 6827.011 == σPCP  
{ } { } 2718.06827.09545.0122 =−=−= σσ PPCP  
{ } { } 0428.09545.09973.0233 =−=−= σσ PPCP  
 (36)  
 
The prioritization criterion is then: 
( ))(maxmax TTGinvCP
r
rCPPT ⋅=


⋅=
&
 
 (37)  
The TTG is included as a scale factor in order to take into account the 
approaching geometry. 
Note that, with this method, the extra-size value is related to the measurement 
uncertainties and so to the NACp and NACv values. 
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Chapter 4  
Implementation and Test 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This section will show the algorithm modelling, the simulation environment 
and the main test scenarios and related results. 
In particular in the first part, a description of the algorithms, introduced 
above, will be presented. 
In the second part, tests will be shown in order to verify the effectiveness 
working of the surveillance processing and in order to assess one of the two 
methods, explained in the previous chapter, of conflict detection and 
prioritization. 
In the third part, the assessed software architecture will be inserted in an 
more complex system to support a conflict resolution algorithm. Note that the 
conflict resolution algorithm is out of the scope of this work and more information 
can be found in [54]. Therefore offline test scenarios will be described and the 
results will be shown and discussed. 
The last part will be about the real-time simulation tests. Therefore a 
description of the facility will be shown. Further the test scenarios will be 
presented and the related results will be discussed. 
 
4.2 Sense and Detect Algorithm modelling 
The overall system architecture, and related algorithms, discussed in the 
previous chapter have been modelled in Matlab and Simulink R2009A. 
4.2.1 Surveillance Processing Simulink Scheme 
Figure 4.6 shows the implemented Simulink scheme modelling the 
Surveillance Processing algorithms. The represented scheme is slightly different 
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from the one in Figure 3.2 but it is possible to identify the main modules 
descripted in the previous chapter. In particular: 
• The “GenAndMain1090” block (Figure 4.1) implements, as a unique 
Matlab function, all the functionalities introduced in the paragraph 
3.3.1 and related sub-paragraph. In particular it is in charge of 
generate new tracks into the database and update the existing ones. 
 
Figure 4.1- Generation And Maintenance Simulink Scheme 
The input variables of this module are explained in the following: 
o ADSB_Reports is a bus containing all the ADS-B traffic 
information; 
o TargetGeomAltValid  is a vector related to the validity flag of 
the available geometric altitude value. Note that the 
Generation and Maintenance module works only with 
geometric altitude and the validity flag is managed by 
another block explained in the following; 
o TrackDbOld is a bus representing the track database used in 
the closed loop with a one-step delay. This feedback signal is 
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used to updated the stored track and to add new track into the 
database; 
o Ownship_TOA is a constant value related to the time of 
applicability of ownship position and velocity measuraments; 
o NACp/Epu/Vepu is a matrix implementing Table 3.1; 
o NACv/HorVelAccuracy/VerVelAccuracy is a matrix 
implementing Table 3.2; 
o Q is a constant tunable variable related to the process noise. 
As mentioned above, for this application it is assumed to be 
0.065g2 according to [94] Appendix C. 
The output variable TrackDb is a bus representing the track database. 
• The “TrackTermination” block is a Matlab function that updates the 
database according to the track termination algorithm introduced in 
the paragraph 3.3.2 and it is represented in Figure 4.2. 
 
 
Figure 4.2 - Track Termination Simulink Scheme 
 
The input variables are the following: 
o Ownship_TOA that is a constant value related to the time of 
applicability of ownship position and velocity measuraments; 
o TrackDb which is a bus containing the tracks information; 
o MaximumDataAge that is a tunable parameter, which 
represents the maximum elapsed time, from the last update 
before the track has been deleted from the database. 
The output bus TrackDb_Updated contains all the tracks that are 
available at the current time. 
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• The “CommonTimeTrackExtrapolation” block is a Matlab function 
that implements the functionality described in the paragraph 3.3.3, 
that is the extrapolation of traffic data to a common time of 
applicability. The Simulink scheme is represented in Figure 4.3. 
 
 
Figure 4.3 - Common Time Track Extrapolation Simulink Scheme 
 
The input variables are: 
o Ownship_TOA that is a constant value related to the time of 
applicability of ownship position and velocity measuraments; 
o TrackDb which is a bus containing the tracks information; 
o Q that is a constant tunable variable related to the process 
noise. As mentioned above, for this application it is assumed 
to be 0.065g2 according to [94] Appendix C. 
The output bus TrackDb_CommonTime contains all the tracks 
extrapolated to a common time of applicability. 
As mentioned above, the Generation and Maintenance module works with 
geometric altitude information. Nevertheless, this information is not always 
available and a dedicated module is introduced. The  “BaroAltitude2WGS84” 
block is a Matlab function, represented in Figure 4.4, which implements the 
follow functionalities: 
o If the ADS-B provide a track with a valid pressure altitude measurement 
and an invalid geometric altitude measurement, the module computes the 
geometric altitude based on the valid pressure altitude. Note that in this 
case also the geometric altitude measurement becomes “valid”. 
o If the ADS-B provide a track with a valid geometric altitude measurement 
and an invalid pressure altitude measurement, no conversion is performed. 
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o If the ADS-B provide a track with a valid geometric altitude measurement 
and a valid pressure altitude measurement, no conversion is performed. 
o If the ADS-B provide a track with an invalid geometric altitude 
measurement and an invalid pressure altitude measurement, no conversion 
is performed. 
 
 
Figure 4.4 - Barometric Altitude to Geometric Altitude conversion Simulink Scheme 
 
Only a subset of the traffic information is used for this computation and in 
particular: 
• The targets geometric altitude field; 
• The targets geometric altitude validity flag field; 
• The targets barometric altitude field; 
• The targets barometric altitude validity flag field; 
• The targets latitude field; 
• The number of reports field; 
The output bus includes information about the targets geometric altitude and 
related validity flag. 
The “SelectValidatedTrack” subsystem selects, among all the stored track, 
the ones that can be considered valid, and that can be recorded into the database, 
according to the track validation criterion described in the paragraph 3.3.1. 
The “Out_DatabaseCreation” subsystem, represented in Figure 4.5, selects 
the traffic data useful for the application under study. In particular the information 
that are selected are: 
• The targets latitude in WGS84 reference frame; 
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• The targets longitude in WGS84 reference frame; 
• The targets geometric altitude in WGS84 reference frame; 
• The targets east velocity in WGS84 reference frame; 
• The targets north velocity in WGS84 reference frame; 
• The targets vertical rate in WGS84 reference frame; 
• The targets data time of applicability; 
• The targets participant address; 
• The number of tracks stored into the database. 
 
 
Figure 4.5 - Out Database Creation Simulink Scheme 
 
The remaining blocks LLH2ENU_REPORTS, LLH2ENU_DB, 
ENU2LLH_UnitDelay and ENU2LLH, have been introduced to perform the 
needed reference frame conversions: this makes it possible to feed the main 
blocks with a more suitable data structure. 
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Figure 4.6 - Surveillance Processing Simulink Scheme 
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4.2.2 Coarse Filtering: Simulink Scheme 
The coarse filtering Simulink block is represented in Figure 4.7. It 
implements the functionalities explained in section 3.4. 
 
 
Figure 4.7 – Coarse Filtering Simulink Scheme 
 
The input data are: 
• A bus which identifies the targets position in a local NED reference 
frame; 
• A bus which includes he targets east velocity, north velocity, vertical 
rate and participant address; 
• A bus related to the ownship position in the local NED reference 
frame; 
• A constant tunable value which identifies the coarse filter range 
threshold. 
The out variable is a bus which includes all the traffic information of the 
aircraft whose distance from the ownship is lower than the specified threshold. 
 
4.2.3 Conflict detection and  prioritization Simulink scheme: time-to-
go approach 
The conflict detection and prioritization Simulink modules, based on the 
time-to-go approach, are represented in Figure 4.8 and Figure 4.9. the 
implemented algorithms are described in paragraphs 3.5, 3.5.1 and 3.6.1. 
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Figure 4.8 – Conflict Detection Simulink Scheme 
 
The input variables for the conflict detection subsystem are: 
• Ownship Pos and Vel which is a bus related to the ownship position 
and velocity in a NED reference frame; 
• TargetData that is a bus including traffic information and among 
them the targets position and velocity; 
• NumberOfReports that represents the number of track contained into 
the database. 
The output variables are: 
• r_vec which is a vector including the relative distance between the 
ownship and each aircraft in the database; 
• rdot_vec  which is a vector representing the closure rate between the 
ownship and each aircraft in the database; 
• ConflictDetection_vec which is a vector of Boolean values: the value 
is 1 if the considered aircraft pose a conflict to the ownship, 
otherwise the value is 0; 
• RwithExtraSize_vec which is a vector including the safety bubble 
radius, with extra-size, related to each intruder aircraft. 
Those variables, excluding the extra-size radius, are the input variables for 
the prioritization subsystem. The others input variables, for prioritization module, 
are the bus related to the track database TargetsDB and the 
ParticipantAddress_vec that is a vector including the participant addresses of 
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aircraft stored into the database. The two main subsystems of the prioritization 
module are: 
• Compute_InvTTG which evaluates the inverse of TTG for each 
aircraft into the database; 
• findConflictIndex that selects among all the track available into the 
database the one with the high priority. 
Therefore, the module outputs are: 
• ConflictDetectionIndex which is a boolean value indicating if at least 
one aircraft, among the ones recorded into the database, poses a 
conflict to the ownship; 
• r_conflict that is the relative distance between the ownship and the 
most dangerous threat; 
• rdot_conflict that is the closure rate between the ownship and the 
most dangerous threat; 
• ConflictIndex which is a row index in order to identify the most 
dangerous threat among all the aircraft stored into the database. 
 
 
Figure 4.9 – Time-to-go approach: Prioritization Simulink scheme 
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4.2.4 Conflict detection and  prioritization Simulink scheme: 
uncertainties approach 
The Simulink block for conflict detection and prioritization based on the 
uncertainties approach, introduced in the paragraphs 3.5, 3.5.2 and 3.6.2, is 
represented in Figure 4.10. Both the conflict detection and the prioritization 
algorithms are implemented in a Matlab function whose input are: 
• DataOfOwnship which is a bus including ownship position and 
velocity in a local NEU reference frame; 
• DataOfTargets that is a bus containing information about position, 
velocity, measurements uncertainties (in a local NEU reference 
frame)  and number of tracks stored into the database; 
• SafetyRadius which presents the nominal value of safety bubble 
radius. 
 
 
Figure 4.10 - Uncertainties Approach: Conflict Detection and Prioritize Simulink Scheme 
 
In this case, the output variables are vectors related to the all aircraft 
stored into the database: 
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• r_vec is a vector containing the relative distance between the 
ownship and all the aircraft in the database; 
• rdot_vec is a vector including the closure rate between the ownship 
and all the aircraft in the database; 
• ConflictDetection_vec is a vector whose element are Boolean which 
indicate if the generic aircraft in the database poses a conflict to the 
ownship or not; 
• ConflictPriority_vec is a vector indicating the order priority 
according to the equation (37) (paragraph 3.6.2); 
• ConflictDetectionIndex which is a boolean value indicating if at least 
one aircraft, among the ones recorded into the database, poses a 
conflict to the ownship; 
• RwithExtraSize_vec which is a vector including the safety bubble 
radius, with extra-size, related to each intruder aircraft. 
 
4.3 Unitary Performance Tests 
Prior to introduce the software architecture adopted to perform offline and 
real-time test, a performance test campaign has been carried out in order to 
establish the working of some modules. In particular unitary tests have been 
performed on the following modules: 
• Surveillance Processing module, in order to establish the module 
performances; 
• Safety bubble extra-size radius computation and Prioritization 
modules, in order to define which approach, between the proposed 
ones, has to be integrated in the assessed software architecture. 
 
4.3.1 Surveillance Processing: Tracking Filter Test 
In order to establish the performance of the introduced tracking filter, some 
tests have been performed [101]. 
The test scenarios foresee the presence of the ownship (receiver participant) 
and one intruder aircraft (transmitter participant) and both the aircraft move with 
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constant velocity. The module performance are evaluated as NACp and NACv 
values, of the transmitter participant, change. 
A local ENU reference frame it is considered, with origin in the ownship. 
The latter is assumed to move, when the simulation starts, with constant velocity 
at 35m/s along the x/east and y/north axis and the vertical rate is zero. The 
intruder starts at 5000 m along x and y axis, with an initial velocity of 35 m/s 
along the x/east and y/north axis and of 1 m/s along the z/up axis. In the first 
scenario the NACp value of the intruder is 9 and NACv value is 3: according to 
Table 3.1 and Table 3.2, those values correspond to EPU<30 m, VEPU<45 m, 
HVA<1 m/s and VVA<1.52 m/s. The error between the estimated position along 
the x direction and the simulated one, is reported in Figure 4.11: the root mean 
square (rms) error is of about 6 m. Figure 4.12 shows the error between the 
estimated velocity and the simulated one along the x direction too: the root mean 
square error is of about 0.5 m/s. 
 
 
Figure 4.11 - Error [m] between the estimated x position and the simulated one – First Scenario 
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Figure 4.12 - Error [m/s] between the estimated east velocity and the simulated one – First Scenario 
 
In the second scenario NACp and NACv  values of the intruder aircraft are 
7 and 2 respectively. It correspond to EPU<185.2 m, VEPU<182.5 m, HVA<3 
m/s and VVA<4.57 m/s. 
As reported in Figure 4.13, the rms error related to the x position is of about 
7 m. Therefore the rms error increases, with respect to the first scenario, due to un 
higher uncertainty value and to the propagation of the error in the filter prediction 
phase.  
 
 
Figure 4.13 - Error [m] between the estimated x position and the simulated one – Second Scenario 
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Nevertheless, the rms of velocity component along the x axis reduces and it is of 
about 0.09 m/s. This behaviour is related to the assumption of constant velocity 
for the intruder aircraft. In fact, the intruder dynamic model is consistent with the 
simulated intruder aircraft motion and the dynamic model influences the velocity 
estimation more than the measurements, i.e. the gain values of the Kalman filter 
are small. 
 
 
Figure 4.14 - Error [m/s] between the estimated east velocity and the simulated one – Second Scenario 
 
In the last scenario the intruder dynamic model is not compliant with the 
simulated intruder aircraft motion: the intruder aircraft moves with a constant 
acceleration, of 0.1 m/s2 along the x/east direction. The NACp and NACv values 
are the same of the previous scenario. Figure 4.16 shows that the velocity rms 
error is of about 0.2 m/s: the error increases due to the difference between the 
assumed dynamic model and the simulated motion.  
Note that in all the scenarios, the errors are compliant with the NACp and 
NACv values. 
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Figure 4.15 - Error [m] between the estimated x position and the simulated one – Third Scenario 
 
 
 
Figure 4.16 - Error [m/s] between the estimated east velocity and the simulated one – Third Scenario 
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4.3.2 Surveillance Processing Tests 
The following simulation scenarios are introduced in order to evaluate the 
functionalities of Track Generation and Maintenance, Track Termination and 
Common Time extrapolation. It is assumed that there are not uncertainties 
associated to the transmitted position and velocity measurements. In other words, 
the exact velocity and position of intruders aircraft are received on-board.  
In the first scenario an intruder and the ownship are flying in an head-on 
conflict geometry. A local ENU reference frame, centred in the ownship, is 
considered. The simulation lasts 80 s but, at 50 s, not valid state information are 
transmitted by the intruder aircraft. In Figure 4.17 three line are represented: 
• The red line is related to the measurements data, received from the 
simulated on-board ADS-B IN device, and considered as input for 
the Generation and Maintenance module; 
• The blue line refers to the elaborated data recorded into the database 
after the generation and maintenance processing; 
• The green line refers to the state intruder data extrapolated at the 
time of applicability of Ownship measurements. 
 
 
Figure 4.17 – Surveillance Processing Tests: Intruder Position - Scenario 1 
As states above, at about 50 s no valid measurements are received (Figure 
4.18). The track information are propagated for the following 15 s (lines blue and 
green) and then are terminated. When the track is terminated the output value for 
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intruder position and velocity is zero. When no valid measurements are received, 
the difference between the green line and the blue one became more significant. 
Beforehand, the update frequency was high enough to not allow to see differences 
between the blue and the green lines.  
 
 
Figure 4.18 - Measurements Validity Flag - Scenario 1 
 
In the second scenario, the conflict geometry is the same of the previous 
scenario but, initially the input intruder latitude oscillates so that two consecutives 
reports do not correlate until 50 s. It simulates a damage in ADS-B OUT or ADS-
B IN device. Since the reference frame used for Figure 4.19 is a local reference 
frame centred in the ownship, the latitude oscillation converts in an oscillation 
along x and y directions. When the signal stabilizes, and two consecutive reports 
correlate, the track is added into the database and the state information are output. 
 
Figure 4.19 - Surveillance Processing Tests: Intruder Position - Scenario 2 
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The third scenario aircraft geometry is similar to the previous ones, but the 
latitude oscillation starts at about 50 s. When the oscillation starts, it indicates that 
no valid measurements are provided to the surveillance module and, hence, the 
track is propagated for the following 15 s (lines blue and green) and then it is 
deleted from the database (Figure 4.20). Regarding the representation of latitude 
oscillation the same consideration of the previous case are valid. 
 
Figure 4.20 - Surveillance Processing Tests: Intruder Position - Scenario 3 
 
In the last scenario the intruder and the ownship are, still, in an head-on 
geometry and the transmitter intruder latitude oscillates when the simulation time 
is included between 50 s and 60 s. It simulates that no valid traffic information are 
received in that time interval. Figure 4.21 shows that the intruder velocity and 
position are propagated in that time interval using the last validated information 
and when the latitude stabilizes again the track update takes into account the 
measurements information. 
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Figure 4.21 - Surveillance Processing Tests: Intruder Position - Scenario 4 
 
4.3.3 Safety bubble extra-size radius computation 
The conflict condition criterion is reported in Eq.(38): 
 
extracpa RRd +<   (38)  
 
where: 
• cpad  is the distance at the closest point of approach; 
• R  is the nominal value of the safety bubble radius; 
• extraR  is the extra-size radius introduced to take into account of the 
relative dynamic between the ownship and the intruder aircraft or the 
measurements uncertainties of the intruder aircraft. 
As explained in the previous chapter, two methods are introduced for the 
computation of the extra-size radius, related to two methods of prioritization 
criterion: 
• A first method based on the computation of the closure rate ( r& ) 
between the ownship and the surrounding aircraft: 
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Conflict Detection Pioritization 
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Table 4.1 – Conflict Detection and Prioritization based on the closure rate 
 
In this case the extra-size radius is the product between a scale factor 
k, assumed to be 5 for this simulation, and the closure rate. Once the 
conflict detection condition has been verified for more than one 
aircraft stored in the database, the most dangerous threat 
prioritization is computed based on the minimum TTG value. 
• A second method based on the uncertainties related to the 
computation of the closest point of approach (and relate to the NACp 
and NACv values broadcasted by the traffic): 
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Table 4.2 - Conflict Detection and Prioritization based on the measurements uncertainties 
 
In this case three bubble can be computed around the intruders 
aircraft. The three bubble radius are given by the nominal value and 
the closest point of approach standard deviation at 
cpad∆σ1 , cpad∆σ2  
and 
cpad∆σ3 . The priority threat is given by the maximum value of the 
product between the probability of the conflict, based on the radius 
that generates the conflict, and the inverse of TTG. 
Two simulation test scenarios are described in order to define the proper 
method to use. 
In the first scenario an intruder aircraft and the ownship move, with constant 
velocity, in an head-on geometry. Considering a NED reference frame centred in 
the runway, the initial state of the aircraft are shown in Table 4.3. 
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Ownship Intruder Aircraft 
x=1000m; y=100m; z=-300m x=100m; y=100m; z=-300m 
Vx=-35m/s; Vy=0m/s; Vz=0m/s Vx=35m/s; Vy=0m/s; Vz=0m/s 
Table 4.3 - Initial state of ownship and intruder aircraft 
 
The NACp value transmitted by the intruder is assumed to be 11 (EPU<3m, 
VEPU<4m) and the NACv is equal to 4 (HVA<0.3m/s; VVA<0.46m/s). The safety 
radius computed with the two methods is represented in Figure 4.22 and Figure 
4.23. 
 
Figure 4.22 – Safety radius bubble: closure rate method – First Scenario 
 
 
Figure 4.23 - Safety radius bubble: uncertainties method – First Scenario 
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The first method gives a constant value for the safety bubble radius due to 
the assumption of constant velocity motion for both the intruder and the ownship. 
The second method provides a value definitively lower than the first one, and 
almost constant, because the uncertainties are rather low for this simulation.  
The initial state conditions, for  the ownship and the intruder aircraft, are the 
same of the previous scenario but the NACp and the NACv values of the intruder 
aircraft are reduced and equal to 8 (EPU<92.6m, VEPU<92.6) and 3 (HVA<1m/s, 
VVA<1.52m/s), respectively.  As reported in Figure 4.24 and Figure 4.25, the 
safety radius computed with the first method is unchanged, but the second one 
amplifies due to an increase of received measurements uncertainties. nevertheless, 
it is lower than the first one again. 
 
 
Figure 4.24 - Safety radius bubble: closure rate method – Second Scenario 
 
Figure 4.25 - radius bubble: uncertainties method – Second Scenario 
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Therefore, the method based on the closure rate provides a safety radius 
higher, but depending on the choice of the k parameter, than the safety radius 
related to the uncertainties method. Nevertheless the safety radius provided by the 
second method is strictly connected to the variation of the NACp and NACv 
values that can significantly change during the flight and it could led to an 
unstable algorithm.  
The instability of the safety bubble computation and, consequently, the 
instability of prioritization and conflict detection algorithms could compromise 
the correct working of the whole architecture. Therefore, the closure rate based 
algorithm is chosen to be integrated in the tested software architecture. 
 
4.4 Numerical Testing 
4.4.1 Simulation Environment for Numerical Testing Description 
The proposed approach has been tested by means of numerical simulations 
representing some relevant conflict scenarios, carried out with the aim of 
assessing the applicability of ADS-B data for conflict detection purposes. The 
intruders’ motion has been simulated by using simple kinematic 3D motion 
model, whereas the ownship dynamics has been fully modelled by using 6 
degrees-of-freedom aircraft model and suitable autopilot and auto-throttle systems 
[54]. 
The developed ADS-B based subsystems, for the surveillance and conflict 
detection functionalities, have been included in a more complex software 
architecture for an autonomous GNC application. In other words, the system has 
to guarantee the autonomous flight, during the entire flight mission, including the 
autonomous mid-air flight, the take-off and the landing, and the collision 
avoidance [54]. 
The software architecture of the whole system is represented in Figure 4.26. 
A brief description of the represented subsystems is provided in the following: 
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Figure 4.26 - Autonomous GNC Software Architecture 
 
• The Mission Automation Logic consist of a state machine 
implementing the automation logic of the GNC module. It manages 
the activation of the other module based on the external input. 
• The External Module subsystem includes all the modules that 
generates the input variables for the SCAS/Autopilot. The ASACAS 
module is one of those modules, and it includes conflict detection 
module and the other described before (with the exception of the 
Surveillance Processing Module). 
• The Sensor Conditioning module performs a conversion from raw 
data to engineering data in order to support the autonomous GNC 
algorithms. 
• The Surveillance Processing module elaborates the raw data 
received from the ADS-B IN device in order to feed the External 
Modules with a more suitable data structure. 
• The WP Management module generates the WP, and the related 
information, to be followed. 
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• The SCAS/Autopilot module implements the velocity control 
(Autothrottle), the altitude and vertical speed control, the heading or 
inertial velocity control and the attitude control. 
• The Selection and Protection module selects the state references and 
configuration codes to supply the SCAS/Autopilot. Moreover it 
selects the configuration command for the Sensor Conditioning 
module, and it activates the flaps based on the TAS value. 
 
4.4.2  Numerical Testing Results 
In this section, two exemplary numerical simulation trials are reported and 
described in order to show how the proposed system works [102]. The considered 
scenarios are: 
• Case A – The scenario refers to typical head-on approach conflict 
geometry, involving ownship and one intruder flying at the same 
altitude; 
• Case B – The scenario refers to the presence of three intruders with 
two of them that represent a conflict condition with ownship. 
For what concerns the case A, the overall evolution of the flight is reported 
in Figure 4.27. The simulation of the flight starts at 5 s of the simulation time (the 
previous time is needed for simulation environment initialization purposes), with 
vehicles, whose initial trajectories are straight lines, approaching according to 
head-on conflict geometry and flying at the same altitude. 
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Figure 4.27 - Aircraft Trajectories - Case A 
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Figure 4.28 - Mission Automation Logic - Case A 
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The change is motivated by the satisfaction of the conflict detection condition: 
indeed, the vehicles are at a distance lower than the coarse filtering threshold and 
are approaching (see Figure 4.29) with predicted violation of the safety bubble.  
 
 
Figure 4.29 - Aircraft Relative Distance - Case A 
 
The collision avoidance manoeuver continues until the vehicles start 
diverging. The vehicles start diverging at 107.4 s, so leading to the exit from the 
conflict condition and to the subsequent change of the mission automation logic 
signal value from 26 (collision avoidance) to 15 (automatic capture of the selected 
waypoint) at 108.4 s, according to the execution frequency of the software system. 
Based on these considerations, the overall flight evolution for the case A, 
can be summarized as: 
• the conflict is detected only when the distance between intruder and 
ownship is lower than the coarse filtering threshold and the conflict 
detection condition is satisfied, i.e. at 54.8 s of simulation time; 
• therefore, the conflict resolution manoeuver is calculated and 
implemented; 
• the resolution manoeuver ends at 108.4 s, when the ownship starts 
again its flight in order to capture the destination waypoint, after 
having deviated from its original route due to collision avoidance 
manoeuver implementation. 
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For what concerns the case B, the overall evolution of the flight is reported 
in Figure 4.30. The simulation of the flight starts at 5 s of the simulation time (the 
previous time is needed for simulation environment initialization purposes), with 
vehicles, whose initial trajectories are straight lines, approaching according to 
lateral conflict geometry and flying at the same altitude. 
 
 
Figure 4.30 - Aircraft Trajectories - Case B 
 
The system behaviour can be derived from the analysis of its logic 
evolution, with consideration similar to the ones expressed for the detailed 
analysis of the case A. In Figure 4.31 the mission automation logic signal is 
reported: the logic signal value 26 indicates that, already from the start of the 
simulation, the conflict detection system implemented on-board the ownship 
identifies a conflict condition, so leading to the activation of the conflict 
resolution manoeuver. Indeed, as evident from the analysis of Figure 4.32 and 
Table 4.4, the detected conflict condition involves two intruders (namely the 
intruder 1 and the intruder 2), so leading to the need of prioritizing the two 
conflicts according to the criterion described in the previous chapter.  
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Figure 4.31 - Mission Automation Logic - Case B 
 
 
 
Figure 4.32 - Aircraft Relative Distance - Case B 
 
 
 Intruder 1 Intruder 2 
Relative Distance [m] 2552 3251 
Closure Rate [m/sec] 45 45 
TTG [sec] 57 72 
Table 4.4 - Most significant values for conflict prioritization 
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Once the conflicts have been prioritized, the conflict resolution manoeuver 
is implemented with respect to the most relevant conflict according to the time-to-
go prioritization criterion: in this scenario, the highest priority conflict is the one 
with the intruder 1. The collision avoidance manoeuver continues until the 
vehicles start diverging, i.e. up to 57.4 s of the simulation time. After that, the 
mission automation logic value changes to 15, indicating the activation of the 
automatic navigation towards a destination waypoint different from the initial one 
due to the implementation of the collision avoidance manoeuver. The waypoint is 
captured at 149.5 s, so that the mission automation logic changes to 24, indicating 
that the ownship continues in a straight levelled flight. 
The collision avoidance maneuver consists in suitable modification of the 
ownship trajectory as well as velocity magnitude in order to assure that the 
ownship will pass behind intruder 1 (and in this case also behind the intruder 2, 
which represents lower priority conflict). 
Based on these considerations, the overall flight evolution for the case B, 
can be summarized as: 
• the conflict is detected only when the distance between intruders and 
ownship is lower than the coarse filtering threshold and the conflict 
detection condition is satisfied, i.e. in this case already from the 
simulation beginning; 
• being detected two conflicts (with intruder 1 and with intruder 2), 
the two detected conflicts are prioritized according to the associated 
TTG; 
• the resolution manoeuver is then calculated and implemented with 
respect to the most relevant conflict condition (the one with the 
intruder 1); 
• the resolution manoeuver ends at 57.4 s, when the ownship starts 
again its flight in order to capture the updated destination waypoint, 
after having deviated from its original route due to collision 
avoidance manoeuver implementation. 
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4.5 Real-Time Testing 
4.5.1 Simulation Facility Description 
Following the fast-time simulation campaign, dedicated real-time simulation 
campaign has been carried out in order to assess the behaviour of the proposed 
system in presence of the real-time implementation constraints. Suitable 
information about the real-time tests will be provided in the following section IV, 
whereas in this section the laboratory setup used for real-time simulation is 
described. Detailed description of this facility can be found in [103]. 
The laboratory setup comprises all the ground segment equipment and the 
Flight Control Computer that is designed to be installed on-board of the CIRA 
experimental platform FLARE. The flying platform is constituted by a VLA 
optionally piloted vehicle, i.e. a vehicle equipped for completely automatic flight 
that is managed by the Remote Pilot Station that can be, where needed, also 
piloted by the safety pilot on-board [104]. Furthermore, the laboratory facility is 
equipped with suitable flight simulator, reproducing the dynamical behaviour of 
the vehicle FLARE and the external environmental conditions where the vehicle 
is simulated to fly. In addition, the surrounding traffic is also simulated by means 
of dedicated traffic simulator. 
The laboratory set-up functional architecture is shown in Figure 4.33, where 
it is emphasized that the main elements of the laboratory test rig are: 
 
• Flight Control Computer; 
• Ground Segment (Remote Pilot Station); 
• Aircraft and Sensors simulator; 
• Traffic simulator; 
• Pilot Cockpit and Interceptor Commands Emulator. 
 
It is worth noticing in Figure 4.33 that the aircraft and sensors simulator is 
interconnected not only with the Flight Control Computer but also with the 
Ground Control Computer. This connection is not present in the real experimental 
set-up, but it is necessary to simulate the direct connection between the pilot’s 
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cockpit and the aircraft because in the laboratory set-up the Ground Control 
Computer manages also the communications with the pilot's cockpit simulation 
computer. 
 
 
Figure 4.33 - Laboratory Setup Architecture 
 
Furthermore, in the laboratory setup  the same hardware platform is used for 
the acquisition of pilot direct link commands, for the management of the 
laboratory pilot real cockpit and for the data communications management 
between aircraft simulator and ground segment. This does not constitute  a 
limitation of the proposed real-time validation test rig, because the software 
module devoted to the pilot commands acquisition and laboratory real cockpit 
management does not have any link with the software module devoted to the data 
Traffic 
Simulator 
ADSB 
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management between the ground segment and the on board segment, even if they 
are allocated on the same hardware. 
The traffic simulator is connected only to aircraft and sensors simulator. It 
provides the simulation of the ADS-B OUT signals sent by the surrounding 
vehicles and received by the ADS-B IN device simulated on-board of the FLARE 
platform. The simulation of the ADS-B OUT signal transmission includes the 
possibility of reproducing also failures like link loss , delay and so on. 
Nevertheless, it is worth to emphasize here that simulation of failures and/or 
disturbances affecting the ADS-B signal broadcast has not been considered in the 
real-time simulation campaign addressed in this paper, where ideal behaviour of 
the ADS-B signal exchange has been reproduced. The external sensors interface 
of the ADSB module, similarly to the interfaces of the other sensors, reproduces 
the real protocol. 
The aim of the laboratory set-up is to test the software implemented on the 
Flight Control Computer and the ground segment software needed for the mission 
management. Achieving this goal is done correctly simulating all sensors on 
board. The software architecture of the aircraft and sensors simulator is composed 
by the modules listed in the following: 
• six degrees of freedom (6dof) aircraft model module; 
• sensors simulation module; 
• external interface sensors simulation module; 
•  actuators simulation module; 
• external weather conditions simulation module; 
• pilot’s cockpit management module. 
The 6dof aircraft model module is the core of the whole simulation 
software. The sensors and external interface sensors simulation modules are based 
on the COTS elements installed on the experimental set-up. The actuators 
simulation module implements the open loop model of each actuator. The external 
weather simulation is necessary to reproduce wind gust, shear and turbulence in 
all flight phases. Nevertheless, in the test cases presented in the next section, the 
wind disturbances have not been reproduced, because the provided description 
aims emphasizing the behaviour of the proposed conflict detection system and not 
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the guidance system robustness with respect to external disturbances. It is worth 
to emphasize here that for the description of the overall performances and 
functionalities of the Guidance, Navigation and Control system implemented on-
board the FLARE vehicle the reader can be referred to literature papers in [105] - 
[108]. 
The Pilot’s cockpit management, finally, is a software module which 
acquires the laboratory pilot commands trough an Ethernet link between the 6dof 
aircraft model of the vehicle and the pilot commands acquisition software 
implemented on a PC104. 
 
4.5.2 Real-Time Testing Results 
Up to date the proposed system has been validated by means of fast-time 
numerical simulations, including the analysis of relevant conflict scenarios. Those 
scenarios have been defined with the aim of assessing the applicability of ADS-B 
data for conflict detection purposes. The ownship dynamic has been simulated by 
means of a 6dof aircraft model with autopilot and auto-throttle system, whereas 
the intruders’ motion model has been simulated by means of a kinematic 3dof 
motion model. 
Based on the positive results obtained in the fast-time simulation campaign, 
the activities devoted to the development of the proposed system addressed the 
real-time simulation stage [109]. The real-time simulation campaign included 
several scenarios, involving different conflict geometries and one or more 
conflicting vehicles. Three significant  real-time simulation trials are reported and 
discussed, which are considered suitable to describe the testing of the overall 
architecture paying particular attention to the conflict detection and the 
prioritization modules. In all the scenarios here reported nominal behavior of the 
ADS-B systems (both the OUT installed on-board the surrounding vehicles and 
the IN installed on-board the ownship) has been supposed and no external 
disturbances (such has wind) have been reproduced.. 
The considered scenarios are: 
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• CASE A – in this scenario the ownship and one intruder are flying, 
with constant velocity, at the same altitude in a typical head-on 
approach geometry; 
• CASE B – the scenario presents two intruders and both represent a 
conflict condition with the ownship; 
• CASE C – the scenario refers to the presence of two intruders which 
represent consecutive conflict conditions with the ownship. 
For what concerns the CASE A, the flight evolution is reported in Figure 
4.34. The ownship and the unique intruder are approaching according to an head-
on geometry. Once the intruder vehicle approached at a distance equal or lower to 
4000 m the conflict condition is expected to be detected. 
 
 
Figure 4.34 - Aircraft Trajectories - Case A (Real-Time Simulation) 
 
Coherently with the system expected behavior, therefore, Figure 4.35 shows 
that at 46.1 s the intruder enters the coarse filter radius and, therefore, the conflict 
resolution maneuver starts as reported in Figure 4.36, where the evolution of the 
system mission automation logic is reported. As mentioned before, the logic 
signal values 15 and 16 indicate flight modes related to the automatic waypoints 
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navigation. At 46.1 s the signal changes from 16 to 26 indicating the activation of 
the collision avoidance maneuver and the satisfaction of the conflict detection. At 
99.9 s the logic signal returns to 16 indicating the end of the conflict condition. 
Finally, the mission automation logic changes to 24 indicating that the ownship 
continues in a straight leveled flight. 
 
 
Figure 4.35 - Aircraft Relative Distance - Case A (Real-Time Simulation) 
 
 
Figure 4.36 - Mission Automation Logic - Case A (Real-Time Simulation) 
 
Hence, the collision avoidance maneuver continues until the aircraft start 
diverging. 
The overall evolution for the Case A can be summarized as follows: 
• the ownship and the single intruder are flying at same altitude in an 
head-on geometry; 
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• the conflict is detected when the intruder enters the coarse filter 
radius (i.e. 4000 m) and the conflict detection condition is satisfied, 
i.e. at 46.1 s of the simulation time; 
• the conflict resolution maneuver is computed and executed; 
•  the conflict resolution maneuver ends when the aircraft start 
diverging, i.e. at 99.9 s, so the ownship starts again the automatic 
waypoints navigation after a deviation from its original route. 
For what concerns the CASE B, the evolution of the flights are reported in 
Figure 4.37. The two intruders start to send the ADS-B OUT data 36.1 s after the 
simulation starts (corresponding to the achievement of the ownship assigned first 
waypoint,  as set in the scenario simulation system). Both the intruders are flying 
at the ownship altitude with straight line trajectories. 
 
 
Figure 4.37 - Aircraft Trajectories - Case B (Real-Time Simulation) 
 
As it can be seen in Figure 4.38, when the ownship start receiving ADS-B 
data, both intruders are inside the coarse filter threshold and it results that the 
detected conflict condition involves both the intruders and the prioritization of 
these conflicts by the system is needed. 
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Figure 4.38 - Aircraft Relative Distance - Case B (Real-Time Simulation) 
 
Once the conflicts have been prioritized, according to the criterion explained 
above, the collision avoidance maneuver is implemented with respect to the most 
relevant conflict, i.e. in this case Intruder 1. This intruder is the one with higher 
priority because, as it can be derived from the analysis of Table 4.5, it has a lower 
TTG with respect to the Intruder 2. 
The logic evolution reported in Figure 4.39 shows, therefore, that the 
collision avoidance maneuver starts at 36.1 s and lasts until 94.1 s instant, when 
the Intruder 1 and the ownship start diverging. It is worth noticing here that, at the 
end of the conflict with Intruder 1, the Intruder 2 does not pose anymore a conflict 
with respect to the ownship, so the ownship continues its navigation towards the 
assigned waypoint. 
 
 Intruder 1 Intruder 2 
Relative Distance [m] 2660 3590 
Closure Rate [m/sec] 59 55 
TTG [sec] 45 64 
Table 4.5 - Most significant values for conflict prioritization (Real-Time Simulation) 
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Figure 4.39 - Mission Automation Logic - Case B (Real-Time Simulation) 
 
In this case, the collision avoidance maneuver consists in a suitable 
modification of the ownship trajectory as well as velocity magnitude in order to 
assure that the ownship will pass behind the Intruder 1. 
The overall evolution for the Case B can be summarized as follows: 
• the ownship starts receiving traffic ADS-B data at 36.1 s and both 
intruders, which characterize the scenario, are inside the coarse filter 
radius and represent a conflict condition with respect to the ownship; 
• the two conflicts are prioritized according to the TTG criterion 
explained earlier, i.e. the Intruder 1 represents the most relevant 
conflict; 
• the conflict resolution maneuver is computed and executed with 
respect to the Intruder 1; 
• the conflict resolution maneuver ends when the aircraft start 
diverging, i.e. at 99.1 s; 
• the ownship starts again the automatic waypoints navigation after a 
deviation from its original route, due to the circumstance that the 
resolution maneuver with respect to the intruder 1 is concluded and 
at this point intruder 2 does not represent anymore a conflict for the 
ownship. 
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It has to be noticed here that the conflict resolution manoeuver with respect 
to intruder 1 allowed also the simultaneous resolution of the conflict with respect 
to the intruder 2, in this particular case. Nevertheless, this is a result of this 
specific scenario and it is not a general feature of the system here proposed, which 
is aimed to solve only the primary conflict, without regard of the other conflicts 
that have been detected but have lower priority. 
The last scenario (CASE C) considers the presence of two intruders which 
represent consecutive conflict conditions with the ownship. From the analysis of 
the flights evolution, reported in Figure 4.40 and Figure 4.41, it is clear that the 
two intruders enter the coarse filter radius in consecutive instants. Also in this 
case, the intruders send ADS-B data after they reached their first assigned 
waypoint (at 33.5 s), according to the scenario simulation conditions that have 
been set. 
 
Figure 4.40 - Aircraft Trajectories - Case C (Real-Time Simulation) 
 
The system behavior can be derived from the analysis of the logic evolution 
reported in Figure 4.42. At 33.5 s the conflict resolution maneuver is activated  
since the Intruder 1 satisfies the conflict detection condition. The maneuver ends 
Chapter 4                                                                            Implementation and Test 
 
96 
 
at 86.5 s, when the ownship and Intruder 1 start diverging. The ownship returns to 
its assigned waypoints navigation until 113.3 s, when the conflict detection 
condition is satisfied once again but in this case with respect to Intruder 2. 
Therefore, the ownship deviates from its route and performs a collision avoidance 
maneuver with respect to the Intruder 2. At 165.8 s, the ownship and the Intruder 
2 exit from the conflict condition. It has to be noticed that in this case no conflict 
prioritization has been needed, because the two conflict are consecutives and do 
not apply at the same time as in the previous scenario (case B). 
 
 
Figure 4.41 - Aircraft Relative Distance - Case C (Real-Time Simulation) 
 
 
Figure 4.42 - Mission Automation Logic - Case C (Real-Time Simulation) 
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The overall evolution for the Case C can be summarized as follows: 
• the ownship starts receiving traffic ADS-B data at 33.5 s and one of 
the intruders, which characterize the scenario, is inside the coarse 
filter radius and  represents a conflict condition with respect to the 
ownship; 
• a conflict resolution maneuver is computed and executed with 
respect to the Intruder 1; 
• the conflict resolution maneuver ends when the aircraft start 
diverging, i.e. at 86.5 s and the ownship returns to its assigned 
waypoints navigation condition; 
• at 113.4 s a new conflict, with the Intruder 2, is detected; 
• a conflict resolution maneuver is computed and executed with 
respect to the Intruder 2; 
• the ownship starts again the automatic waypoints navigation after a 
deviation from its original route at 165.8 s.   
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Conclusions 
 
The aim of the work is to introduce an innovative ADS-B data based 
conflict detection system. The intended system applicability is for both manned 
commercial aircraft, as an aid to pilots system, and UAS, where high automation 
levels are required, as part of an autonomous sense and avoid system. 
Based on the results of the simulations, the proposed approach shows to be 
able to implement the use of the surveillance data provided by the ADS-B IN for 
conflict detection purposes. This includes the possibility to support both advanced 
mission visualization displays for pilot situation awareness and automatic 
algorithms for conflict detection and resolution, for both tactical separation 
assurance and emergency collision avoidance.  
Moreover, the real-time simulated scenarios above reported show that the 
proposed approach to conflict detection and prioritization based on the use of 
ADS-B surveillance data is suitable for efficient real-time implementation with no 
numerical and/or computational issues.  
Test results demonstrated that the proposed system is suitable for integration 
as part of a complete airborne sense and avoid systems although a robust safety 
assessment would be needed through extensive simulation and flight test 
campaigns. 
Currently the proposed algorithms are included in the on-going European 
project RAID (RPAS ATM Integration Demonstration) in the framework of 
SESAR JU program. The project aims to verify the possibility of the proposed 
system to support the airborne SAA system for either Self-Separation and 
Collision Avoidance functionalities in order to assist the integration of UAVs in 
the NAS. 
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